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Essays On Innovation
Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters on topics in innovation. The first chapter analyzes how alternative
patent enforcement regimes affect inventors in the market. How does a change in enforcement costs influence
the inventors' decisions to keep, sell to an intermediary, or enforce their patents through litigation? How much
do inventors earn out of patent enforcement and trade under alternative cost structures? I combine publicly
available litigation data with data on intermediaries to (i) document the impact of having tougher standards
on the preliminary injunction on patent sale prices and incentives, (ii) calibrate a dynamic game, (iii) simulate
counter-factual outcomes under different patent enforcement systems to quantify benefits on inventors.
Reduced-form analysis of the data shows that small firms operating in high-risk litigation sectors are more
likely to sell their patents after the implementation of tougher standards on the preliminary injunction.
Moreover, such a change in standards decreases the price that inventors receive from the patent sale. To
capture the impact of alternative regimes on inventors, I develop and calibrate a dynamic game played
between an inventor, an intermediary and a licensee. In the model, inventors have the option to keep, litigate
or sell their assets to an intermediary. An intermediary negotiates a price with inventors and chases licensees,
picks the optimal time to enforce, and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the licensee. The key point of this
model is the difference between enforcement technologies of inventors and intermediaries in generating
returns from enforcement. Intermediaries can settle the cases outside the courtroom and share the surplus
with inventors. The quantitative analysis suggests that in equilibrium, the average litigation fees paid increases
by 7.46 (no-intermediary world), 2.5 (British Rule), and 3.5 (intermediary-pays-all rule) percent.
Additionally, the average earnings of inventors decrease by 15.23 (no-intermediary world), 2 (British Rule),
2.5 (intermediary-pays-all rule) percent. The findings of this chapter can help to inform future policy change
on patent enforcement.
In the second chapter, which is based on research that I conducted with David S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit, I
answer the following question: How do non-practicing entities (patent trolls) impact innovation and
technological progress? The question has enormous importance to industrial policy, with little direct evidence
to inform it. This chapter provides new evidence on the subject, both theoretically and empirically. In doing
so, I inform the debate that has portrayed non-practicing entities (NPEs) alternatively as benign middlemen
that help to reallocate IP to where it is most productive or stick-up artists that exploit the patent system to
extract rents, thereby hurting innovation. I make use of unprecedented access to NPE-derived patent and
financial data as well as a novel model that guides my data analysis. I find that NPEs target patents coming
from small firms and those that are more litigation-prone, as well as ones that are not core to a company's
business. When NPEs license patents, those that generate higher fees are closer to the licensee's business and
more likely to be litigated. I also find that downstream innovation drops in fields where patents have been
acquired by an NPE. Finally, my numerical analysis shows that the existence of the NPE encourages upstream
innovation and discourages downstream innovation. I also find that the impact of an NPE on the overall
innovation depends on the fraction of infringements coming from non-innovating producers. My results
provide some support for both views of NPEs and suggest that a more nuanced perspective on NPEs as well
as additional empirical work is necessary before informed policy decisions can be made.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON INNOVATION
Holger Sieg
Gokhan Oz
This dissertation consists of two chapters on topics in innovation. The first
chapter analyzes how alternative patent enforcement regimes affect inventors in the
market. How does a change in enforcement costs influence the inventors’ decisions
to keep, sell to an intermediary, or enforce their patents through litigation? How
much do inventors earn out of patent enforcement and trade under alternative cost
structures? I combine publicly available litigation data with data on intermedi-
aries to (i) document the impact of having tougher standards on the preliminary
injunction on patent sale prices and incentives, (ii) calibrate a dynamic game, (iii)
simulate counter-factual outcomes under different patent enforcement systems to
quantify benefits on inventors. Reduced-form analysis of the data shows that small
firms operating in high-risk litigation sectors are more likely to sell their patents
after the implementation of tougher standards on the preliminary injunction. More-
over, such a change in standards decreases the price that inventors receive from the
patent sale. To capture the impact of alternative regimes on inventors, I develop
and calibrate a dynamic game played between an inventor, an intermediary and
a licensee. In the model, inventors have the option to keep, litigate or sell their
v
assets to an intermediary. An intermediary negotiates a price with inventors and
chases licensees, picks the optimal time to enforce, and makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the licensee. The key point of this model is the difference between enforce-
ment technologies of inventors and intermediaries in generating returns from en-
forcement. Intermediaries can settle the cases outside the courtroom and share the
surplus with inventors. The quantitative analysis suggests that in equilibrium, the
average litigation fees paid increases by 7.46 (no-intermediary world), 2.5 (British
Rule), and 3.5 (intermediary-pays-all rule) percent. Additionally, the average earn-
ings of inventors decrease by 15.23 (no-intermediary world), 2 (British Rule), 2.5
(intermediary-pays-all rule) percent. The findings of this chapter can help to inform
future policy change on patent enforcement.
In the second chapter, which is based on research that I conducted with David
S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit, I answer the following question: How do non-practicing
entities (patent trolls) impact innovation and technological progress? The ques-
tion has enormous importance to industrial policy, with little direct evidence to
inform it. This chapter provides new evidence on the subject, both theoretically
and empirically. In doing so, I inform the debate that has portrayed non-practicing
entities (NPEs) alternatively as benign middlemen that help to reallocate IP to
where it is most productive or stick-up artists that exploit the patent system to
extract rents, thereby hurting innovation. I make use of unprecedented access to
NPE-derived patent and financial data as well as a novel model that guides my
vi
data analysis. I find that NPEs target patents coming from small firms and those
that are more litigation-prone, as well as ones that are not core to a company’s
business. When NPEs license patents, those that generate higher fees are closer to
the licensee’s business and more likely to be litigated. I also find that downstream
innovation drops in fields where patents have been acquired by an NPE. Finally,
my numerical analysis shows that the existence of the NPE encourages upstream
innovation and discourages downstream innovation. I also find that the impact of
an NPE on the overall innovation depends on the fraction of infringements coming
from non-innovating producers. My results provide some support for both views of
NPEs and suggest that a more nuanced perspective on NPEs as well as additional
empirical work is necessary before informed policy decisions can be made.
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1 Chapter 1: Monetization of Ideas: Estimat-
ing Inventors’ Gains Under Alternative Patent
Enforcement Regimes
1.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to answer the following questions: What is the
impact of alternative patent enforcement regimes on inventors’ ability to generate
revenue out of their assets? Specifically, how much do inventors earn out of patent
enforcement and trade under alternative cost structures? To answer these questions,
first, I document stylized empirical facts regarding the patent enforcement market
in the U.S. Second, I calibrate a model of patent trade and enforcement in the
presence of intermediaries2 to tackle this question building on Pakes [1986].
Due to the significant financial risk of patent litigation, there has been an effort
to reform patent legislation in recent years. The debate on patent legislation is
mainly centered around the impact of tougher standards of patent enforcement on
2In this chapter, I use the term intermediaries or non-practicing entities(NPE) to refer to
entities that are specialized in generating revenues out of patent licensing and damage awards.
Since the primary purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the business model of the interme-
diaries, interested readers can check Abrams et al. [2017] for extensive discussion on the role of
non-practicing entities in the market.
1
the quality of patents enforced in the market. Proponents of such a reform claim
that making enforcement costly can deter the enforcement of low quality patents.
Opponents of the reform assert that such an increase in costs can deter inventors
from enforcing their ideas altogether, which, in turn, leads to more infringement. It
is important to note that policy propositions on patent enforcement do not increase
enforcement costs equally for inventors and intermediaries. There are laws that
aim to increase the enforcement costs for intermediaries, in addition to laws that
aim to increase enforcement costs across the board for intermediaries and inventors.
Much of the current debate ignores the impact of such a reform on the inventors’
opportunity to monetize their ideas in the market, as well as the revenue generated
from patent trade.
The impact of alternative enforcement regimes on the monetization of ideas is
ambiguous. A change in the enforcement regime can affect the costs of enforce-
ment for both inventors and intermediaries, which impacts the patent sale price
that inventors and intermediaries negotiate in the market. A policy change that
increases the relative costs of enforcement for inventors can potentially facilitate the
monetization of ideas via the sale to intermediaries. On the other hand, a policy
change that increases the relative cost of enforcement for intermediaries decreases
the incentives for trade and can potentially lead to the monetization of ideas via
litigation by inventors.
An increase in enforcement costs across the board may affect inventors by making
2
it costly to litigate infringers. Without the means to litigate their patents, the
benefits from patent trade depend largely on the bargaining power of inventors in
negotiating prices in the patent sale market. Overall, an increase in enforcement
costs may lead inventors to delegate the enforcement decision to intermediaries and
seek compensation in exchange for selling their ideas in the market.
If intermediaries are better at generating revenue from enforcing property rights,
they are more likely to acquire assets from inventors and enforce the patents on their
behalf. This may reduce the total money spent on litigation fees if intermediaries
are more efficient at patent enforcement. The overall effect on inventors, in turn,
depends on the impact of the patent enforcement regime on the relative prices in
the market.
For this chapter, I use data used in Abrams et al. [2017] to understand the
impact of alternative patent enforcement regimes on inventors in the presence of in-
termediaries. Overall, the primary dataset covers patent licensing, acquistion data
starting in early 2000. This dataset is first used by Abrams et al. [2013] to estimate
the relationship between patent value and citations. Abrams et al. [2017] expand
the data used in Abrams et al. [2013]. They combine previously unavailable data
on intermediaries with several publicly available data sources retrieved from PTO,
Compustat, and Lex Machina to compile rich information on the characteristics of
the patents, licensees, and inventors. They try to determine whether non-practicing
entities (NPEs) are merely middlemen or stick-up artists by providing empirical
3
stylized facts on the characteristics of patents that end up at the hands of inter-
mediaries. They also analyze the determinants of patent acquisition and licensing
prices in the market. They find that small firms more likely to sell their patents to
intermediaries and are paid less in comparison to large firms. Licensees are willing
to pay more for patents with higher litigation risk, all other variables being equal.
Moreover, they find that licensing fees increase when the patent is closer to the
operations of the licensee: the less distant the patent is, the more the licensee is
willing to pay. Large firms, on the other hand, sell to intermediaries those patents
that are not a good fit to their core business.
Patent enforcement and trade are highly connected markets and they are contin-
gent on the legal system and frictions in the market for enforcement; therefore, it is
necessary to analyze the effect of enforcement costs on the patent sale price and in-
centives. The Supreme Court verdict (eBay Inc. vs. MercExchange L.L.C.) caused
an increase in the standards to obtain preliminary injunctions such that the plaintiff
is required to invest more resources to prove the validity of the infringement claims.
I show that such a change in enforcement standards have a substantial impact on
the outside option of the inventors. My findings show that small entities operating
in sectors exposed to high-risk litigation are more likely to sell their patents after
the Supreme Court verdict. Additionally, the patent acquisition price diminishes
after the seminal decision. Empirical facts suggest that tougher standards on en-
forcement push less capable firms to sell their ideas at a lower price. The price that
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inventors receive is largely dependent on their negotiation power, which cannot be
observed directly from the data.
In order to establish the link between enforcement activity and the patent sale
market, I develop and calibrate a finite horizon dynamic game. The primary purpose
of the model is to quantify whether NPEs decrease legal fees paid and share the
surplus with inventors. The model has three entities: upstream (those who invent
the technology), downstream (those who implement the technology) and NPEs.
Upstream entities maximize the return out of their patent portfolio by choosing
to keep the patent, sell it to NPEs,or sue the infringers in the market. The value
of the patent to the upstream entity depends on its intrinsic value drawn from
Markov distribution and the proximity of the idea to the firm’s operation. In line
with the empirical regularities of the industry as it is shown in Abrams et al. [2017],
everything else equal, the higher the distance of the patent to the portfolio, the lower
the return is from keeping the patent. The return from enforcement for upstream
entities depends on the number of entrants in the field. The higher the number of
entrants, the higher the returns from enforcement.
The primary purpose of my model is to quantify whether delegation of enforce-
ment to the intermediaries decrease transaction costs and how much of the surplus
generated is transferred to the inventors and what would happen under alterna-
tive patent enforcement regimes. In my model, I extend the framework of Abrams
et al. [2017] by focusing on stick-up artists role of NPE-enforcement activities in
5
generating revenue for inventors by adding relevant dynamics into the model. In
my model, patent value follows a Markov distribution à la Pakes [1986]. On the
enforcement side, conditional on buying the patent, intermediary and downstream
entities play the dynamic game where intermediary picks the settlement offer and
time to enforce the patent. Intermediaries may offer a settlement fee which exceeds
the intrinsic value of the patent to the licensee. Conditional on enforcement by
intermediaries, the case can end up in court or settled outside the court depending
on the preferences of the licensing entities.
The negotiation structure between intermediaries, downstream firms, and up-
stream firms are the key ingredients that enable the model to replicate the qualita-
tive impact of the increase in enforcement cost for the calibrated parameters. Since
the Supreme Court verdict caused an increase in the standards to obtain preliminary
injunctions such that the plaintiff is required to invest more resources to prove the
validity of the infringement claims, within the perspective of the model, this change
has made enforcement relatively costlier for plaintiffs. An increase in enforcement
costs decreases the value of enforcement for upstream entities. The increase in liti-
gation costs affects intermediaries in the following way: Everything else equal, the
cost increase reduces the expected payoff from patent enforcement and increases
the probability of a case being resolved outside the court. Since settlement fees are
determined endogenously, depending on how sensitive the licensees to the increase
in settlement fees, intermediary can decrease the settlement fees and maximize the
6
expected return from enforcement by increasing the probability of the case to be
settled outside the court. The price that intermediary offers to the upstream enti-
ties is determined through Nash Bargaining. Depending on the bargaining power
of both parties, an increase in litigation costs can generate a decrease in acquisition
prices. If inventors have nonzero bargaining power, then a drop in prices must be
smaller than a reduction in the value of litigating the patent for upstream entities.
In order to understand the income that inventors generate out of enforcement
in the market, I need to build the counter-factual outcomes for the patents that
are ended up at the hands of intermediaries, had they not acquired by the inter-
mediaries. There is a challenge in identifying this effect from the data. There is
no way to predict whether patent holders would have enforced their patents by
themselves if they did not sell their patent to intermediaries. The main reasons
are counter-factual outcomes not observed in the data, and the patent acquisition,
litigation, and licensing decisions are not random. Thus, the identification of these
effects requires a structural model.
The model is calibrated via the simulated method of moments. The structural
model allows me to conduct conterfactual policy analysis. The results show that
patent trade is instrumental for innovating firms to earn returns out of their patents.
Quantitative analysis shows that inventors and innovating firms earn 15.23 percent
more on average out of their patents when they are allowed to sell their ideas in
the market in comparison to the case where there is no sale in the market. Average
7
transaction costs decrease by 7.46 percent with intermediaries in comparison to the
case where there is no intermediary.
In order to understand the impact of alternative policies on inventors, I need to
build the counter-factual pricing schemes and outcomes for patents under alterna-
tive policy regimes. There is a significant challenge in identifying this effect only
from the data. Prices and outcomes are functions of bargaining power which is not
observed directly in the data. Empirical results shows that intermediaries are able
to reduce the transaction costs by settling the large fraction of the cases outside
the court and share the surplus with inventors. The analysis of alternative policy
regimes shows that under British Rule average inventor earnings from enforcement
and trade decreases by 2 percent, and average transaction costs increases by 2.5
percent and average profit margin of intermediaries from enforcement decreases by
3 percent. I find that under intermediary-pays-all rule average inventor earnings
from enforcement and trade decreases by 2.5 percent, and average transaction costs
in equilibrium increases by 3.5 percent and average profit margin of intermediaries
from enforcement decreases by 4.2 percent.
The key takeaway from my analysis is that increasing enforcement costs for
every type of agent in the market facilitates patent trade in the sense that less
capable firms transfer their assets to intermediaries who is more efficient at enforcing
patents. On top of that, such an increase in costs are translated into lower prices
for inventors in the patent sale market. I show that the application of different
8
costs for each agent in the market yields dramatic results. A policy change where
enforcement costs decrease for inventors and increase for the intermediaries leads
to excessive enforcement by less capable entities. Furthermore, the policy change
leads to higher litigation fees paid in equilibrium and lowers the price that they
receive from intermediaries. Reduction in patent sale prices is mainly due to the
fact that such policies decrease licensing fees in addition to the profit margin of
intermediaries. Results from this chapter can inform the current debate on patent
enforcement reform, specifically how to regulate intermediaries in the market.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses related
literature. Section 1.3 describes background, data sources and stylized facts. Section
1.4 presents the model. Section 1.5 discusses identification and calibration of the
model. Section 1.6 presents and discusses the quantitative findings from the model.
Section 1.7 presents counterfactual policy analysis. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This chapter relates to several strands of literature. My analysis touches upon the
empirical literature on the effect of property rights on innovation incentives. Galasso
et al. [2013] tries to understand whether patent rights facilitate or impede follow-on
innovation. They formulate their empirical framework around the causal effect of
removing patent rights by court invalidation on subsequent research related to the
focal patent, as measured by later citation. They find that patent rights suppress
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downstream innovation in computers, electronics, and medical instruments, but not
in drugs, chemicals or mechanical technologies. Moreover, the effect is driven by an
invalidation of patents belonging to large entities that give rise to more follow-on
innovation by small entities. Mezzanotti [2016] attempts to quantify the impact
of the change in patent enforcement on innovation activity. The chapter finds
that making it more difficult for firms to get injunction restores the innovation
incentives of large entities by employing difference-in-differences estimator around
policy change. He finds that making it harder to get injunctions has a positive effect
on innovation. A variety of other evidence proposes that policies governing access
to knowledge appear to have substantial effects on follow-on innovation (Murray
[2007], Williams [2013]). This growing body of empirical evidence shows that policy-
relevant distinctions can be instrumental on both theoretical and empirical research
agenda on innovation.
The second is the literature that assesses the business plan of the intermediaries.
Several papers attempt to understand the effect of the specific intermediary called
NPEs’ business plan on the economy.3 Abrams et al. [2017] overcomes the issue of
limited data, which is a major problem of the literature. They try to understand
the effect of NPEs on innovation by comparing two leading theories about NPEs
by using data directly from NPEs. Their data is comprehensive, contrary to other
studies, in the sense that they can keep track of NPE activities. They find a piece of
3For a historical foundation of litigation intermediaries, please check Khan [2013], Khan [2014],
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff [1996], Lamoreaux and Sokoloff [2001], Beauchamp [2016]).
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evidence supporting the idea that the NPEs transfer assets from users that cannot
use them effectively to those who can utilize. Moreover, they also show that NPE-
activity may lead to a decline in innovation. Please check Abrams et al. [2017] for
an extensive discussion.4
On the theory side, my analysis also builds upon the theoretical literature on
settlement through bargaining versus resolving the disputes in court. Spier [2005]
provides an excellent survey of the economics of litigation. My analysis follows
the theoretical literature’s use of dynamic models to simulate the patent value.
Pakes [1986] infers the patent value from patent renewal decisions. He employs a
dynamic discrete choice model to estimate the patent value distributions. Lanjouw
[1998] incorporates infringement in the patent renewal model. She formulated the
infringement game with common knowledge. The most important feature of her
litigation game from the perspective of the renewal model is the following: if the
patentee is not willing to defend her rights when all potential infringers use her
innovation, then it is an equilibrium for them to do so. In this such a case patent
protection has no additional value. This means that nobody is willing to pay for
the renewal. Hence, patent renewal decisions require that the originating firms
are willing to prosecute if every firm were to infringe. It is important to note
4Current literature on NPEs includes the following papers:Lemley and Shapiro [2005], Bessen
and Meurer [2008], Leychkis [2007], Ball and Kesan [2009], Galasso and Schankerman [2010],
Bessen et al. [2011], Chien [2013a], Chien [2013b], Galasso and Schankerman [2014], Bessen and
Meuer [2014], Choi and Gerlach [2014], Cotropia et al. [2014], Feldman [2014], Scott Morton and
Shapiro [2014], Tucker [2014a], Feldman and Lemley [2015], Smeets [2015], Kiebzak et al. [2016],
Feng and Jaravel [2015], Haber and Werfel [2016], Allison et al. [2017] and Sokol [2017], Cohen
et al. [2017].
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that Lanjouw [1998] does not allow for strategic litigation decisions. My analysis
incorporates the intermediaries into such family of models to get the estimates of
the patent value.
Abrams et al. [2017] attempts to understand the impact of NPEs on innovation
by employing a model where inventors innovate ideas and have the option to sell
the ideas to the NPEs while NPEs can engage in two different licensing activities.
First, NPEs can license the ideas productively without engaging in any enforcement
activities. Second, NPEs can threaten to sue licensees to extract more revenue and
decrease innovation incentives of the licensees. Quantitative experiment suggests
that NPE increases the innovation incentives of entrants while decreasing the in-
novation incentives of the licensees. My model differs from Abrams et al. [2017]
in several respects. First, I focus on enforcement activity in a dynamic setting,
which gives me more room for a detailed analysis of the enforcement with respect
to optimal timing of licensing versus going to court. Second, primary aim of my
model to quantify the costs and benefits of alternative patent enforcement regimes
on inventors in the presence of intermediaries in the market.
On the empirical side, my analysis documents the impact of tougher standards
on getting preliminary injunctions on inventors’ outside options. Moreover, contrary
to current literature, my analysis attempts at estimating the bargaining power of
the inventors and quantifying the benefits of the alternative patent enforcement
regimes on inventors. Even though recent literature attempts to answer the same
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question, my analysis tries to achieve this goal with the help of confidential data
and the calibrated structural model.
1.3 Institutional Background, Data Sources, and Stylized Facts
1.3.1 Institutional Background
This section clarifies the institutional structure of the patent enforcement disputes
and trade along with the role of intermediaries in this structure.
Who Can Enforce Patents and Against Whom? Patents give the patent
holder the legal right to exclude others to use the idea in the form of a physical
product. Any infringement claim should be based on physical products since ideas
are materialized through physical products. Naturally, infringement suits involve
firms producing physical products as defendants. Entities who do not produce any
physical products cannot be part of infringement suits as defendants. Intermediaries
fits into this market in the following way: As intermediaries do not produce any
physical products, they can shield themselves against potential infringement suits.
If an infringement suit is not resolved outside the court or is dropped, then a
court evaluates the claims from both parties. A judge or jury who decides in favor
of the patent holder can award monetary damages and issue an injunction at the
earlier stages of the case to prohibit further infringement.
Type of Intermediaries and Restrictions There can be different interme-
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diaries with varying business plans. 5 Due to the confidential nature of the data,
there are mild restrictions on what I can disclose in my analysis. Although there is
no limitation of the type of analysis that I can do, the number of observations and
financial data cannot be disclosed without normalization.
1.3.2 Data Sources
Patent Application Bibliographic Data (PAB)
The database contains basic ‘front page’ data for patents issued from 1963 to 2014.
The database is based on information from a custom extract DVD generated by the
Electronic Information Products Division of the USPTO. The variables used from
this dataset are defined extensively in the Appendix.
Intermediary Data(ND)
The confidential data set requires parsing through its many layers. Please see
Abrams et al. [2017] for further details regarding the data.
Lex Machina (LM)
Data regarding patent litigation is retrieved from Lex Machina Database. The
database lists the patent number, number of cases that a patent is asserted in
court, number of infringements found in each case, number of findings of invalidity,
total damages awarded involving each patent, legal fees, case start date, and end
5Please check Scott Morton and Shapiro [2014] for further details.
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date, and the name of the parties involved in the dispute. The cases include only
USPTO granted patents and covers cases filed after 1999.
U.S. Patent Citation Data (USCIT)
U.S. Patent Citation Data includes citations for utility patents issued between 1975-
2014. Each observation is a citing-cited pair. The database is based on information
from a custom extract DVD generated by the Electronic Information Products
Division of the USPTO. 6
The Careers and Co-Authorship Networks of U.S. Patent Inventors (INV)
Information on the inventors of patents granted in the United States is obtained
from Lai et al. [2010] updated the dataset. These authors use inventor names and
addresses as well as patent characteristics to generate unique inventor identifiers. I
use these unique inventor identifiers for patents that are not identified in PAB.7
1.3.3 Stylized Facts
My empirical analysis utilizes the recent Supreme Court verdict to analyze the
impact of enforcement costs on patent sale incentives, prices. First, I describe the
Supreme Court verdict briefly. Then, I present my empirical facts.
Supreme Court Decision The 2006 (eBay Inc. vs. MercExchange L.L.C.)8
6I complement our citation data with the citation data located at
http://www.patentsview.org/web/.
7Individually owned patents do not have unique identifiers in PAB.
8The Details can also be checked from Lexis Nexis Database. Note that Bessen and Meurer
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decision had a crucial impact on how courts interpret the issuance of permanent
injunctions in disputes involving intellectual property. The injunction is simply
a legal remedy that can be demanded by a plaintiff after infringement claim. If
it is issued, injunction forces the infringer to stop the distribution of goods using
any technology covered by the alleged patents, regardless of the magnitude of the
infringement.
Before 2006, application of the law can be characterized by the automatic is-
suance of an injunction in case of infringement, regardless of the magnitude of
infringement. Such a risk confers substantial bargaining power on plaintiff dur-
ing the negotiations before the injunction is granted. Exceptions to the rule were
uncommon before 2006. It is not surprising as the patent law was derived from
property law, where an injunction is the standard method to resolve disputes.
The ruling (eBay Inc. vs. MercExchange L.L.C.) altered this landscape by
granting courts more flexibility to decide when it is appropriate to issue an injunc-
tion. In particular, the decision stated clearly that the issuance of an injunction
should not happen automatically. Instead, courts should decide on a case-by-case
basis. A typical case should satisfy four different criteria to be able to be eligible
for consideration. This is translated into more resources to be spent on filing the
patent litigation lawsuits.
The Supreme Court aimed to set new norms that would improve the status of
[2008] and Shapiro [2010] argue that change was unexpected using different pieces of qualitative
evidence from news sources and other public records.
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patent enforcement, by eliminating abusive lawsuits and reducing the uncertainty in
the patent system and increasing the amount of effort plaintiff puts in enforcement.
Difference-in-Differences AnalysisMy framework purports to document the
changes in the incentives to trade after an exogenous increase in enforcement costs.9
To do so, I estimate the linear probability model specified in equation 1.3.1:
Patent Salei,t = α + γi + ηt + β × Exposure× After + φ× Exposure × Entity Size× After + ψ × JUi,t + i,t
(1.3.1)
where Patent Salei,t is 1 if entity i sells its patent at time t to intermediaries,
0 otherwise. Equation 1.3.1 is a firm, time level regression which is estimated by
OLS within 3 year window before and after the law change. After takes 1 if year is
after 2006 and 0 otherwise. We drop the year 2006 to neutralize the effect of year
that we observe the law changed. JUi,t is a vector consisting of firm level controls:
After x Entity Size, where entity size is measured as the number of patents in the
entities’ portfolio before the policy change period. α is a constant, γi is the entity
fixed effects while ηt is the time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the entity level. Results are presented in Table 1.1.
The negative coefficient on After x Exposure x Entity Size implies that:
Fact 1: Small firms operating in high risk exposure sectors are more likely to
sell their patents to intermediaries after Supreme Court verdict.
9Please check identification section for details regarding Supreme Court Decision.
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Table 1.1: The Impact of Supreme Court Verdict on Patent Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sale Sale Sale Sale Sale
Dep. Var: Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy
After x Risk Exposure x Entity Size 0.05 -0.30** -0.35*** -0.29** -0.34***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.10)
After x Risk Exposure 3.36*** 3.76*** 3.25*** 3.67***
(1.22) (1.09) (1.21) (1.00)
After x Entity Size 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Entity Size 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Risk Exposure 2.10*** 0.22 0.32**
(0.51) (0.36) (0.15)
Entity Size x Risk Exposure -0.19*** 0.01
(0.05) (0.03)
Constant -0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.01* 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No
R-squared 0.004 0.192 0.004 0.192 0.004
Notes: Linear probability model with Log Licensing and Acquisition Price as dependent variable.
Robust standard errors clustered by deal in parentheses. Please see the text and appendix for
variable definitions and normalization.
My second framework purports to document the response of intermediaries to
the regime change by looking at the differential changes in patent acquisition fees
and the quality of the acquired patents around the law change. I estimate the fol-
lowing the equation 1.3.2 by OLS:
Log Pricei,j,t = α + θj + ηt + β × Exposure× After + ψ ×Mi,j,t + i,j,t (1.3.2)
where Log Pricei,j,t represents acquisition price paid to deal i for technology cate-
gory j at time t. Log Acquisition Fee is calculated as the log normalized acquisition
prices10. Our main variable of interest is After x Exposure. I would like to un-
10The details of normalization can be found in Appendix.
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derstand whether intermediaries’ willingness to pay for patents has changed after
the policy change. To isolate the effect of the main variable of interest, I need to
introduce controls to account for acquired portfolio-specific characteristics. Mi,j,t
consisting of control variables including Exposure, Acquired Portfolio Size, Deal
Age, Lifetime Forward Citations, Backward Citations, Entity Size. Control vari-
ables are calculated at the deal level. Standard errors are clustered at deal level.
α is a constant, θj is technology category fixed effects and ηt is time fixed effects.
Results are reported in Table 1.2.
The negative coefficient on After x Exposure implies that:
Fact 2: Inventors are paid lower prices in upstream market after Supreme Court
verdict.
To be able to understand how the Supreme Court verdict change affected the
quality of acquired patents, I estimate the following 1.3.3 by OLS:
Deal Qualityi,j,t = α+ γj + ηt +β×Exposure×After+ψ×MFi,t + i,t (1.3.3)
where Deal Qualityi,j,t is measured by the mean of the lifetime forward citation
of the deal i, technology category j at time t. Time measures the acquisition year.
Our main variable of interest is After x Exposure. MFi,j,t is a vector consisting
of control variables, consisting of Exposure, Acquisition Deal Size, Age, Backward
Citations, Entity Size. Standard error are clustered at deal level. α is a constant,
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Table 1.2: The Impact of Supreme Court Verdict on Acquisition Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Var: Log Log Log Log
Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition Acquisition
Fee Fee Fee Fee
After x Exposure x Entity Size 0.0001
(0.001)
After x Exposure -0.368** -0.382** -0.376** -0.356**
(0.168) (0.150) (0.158) (0.141)
Exposure 0.375** 0.394*** 0.385** 0.354**
(0.168) (0.150) (0.158) (0.140)
After x Entity Size -0.0001
(0.001)
Entity Size 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquisition Deal Size 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.029 0.025 0.028
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Age2 -0.004** -0.003* -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lifetime Forward Citations 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Backward Citations 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 3.703*** 3.458*** 3.481*** 3.472***
(0.420) (0.462) (0.427) (0.435)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPC Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.296 0.301 0.349 0.350
Notes: Linear probability model with Log Acquisition Price as dependent variable. Robust
standard errors clustered by deal level in parentheses. Please see the text and appendix for
variable definitions and normalization.
and γj is technology category fixed effects while ηt is time fixed effects. Results are
reported in Table 1.3.
The positive coefficient on After x Exposure implies that:
Fact 3: Intermediaries target higher quality patents after Supreme Court ver-
dict.
In light of the facts above, I can claim that a researcher needs more data on
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Table 1.3: The Impact of Supreme Court Verdict on Deal Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Var: Deal Quality Deal Quality Deal Quality Deal Quality
After x Exposure x E. Size 0.004
(0.027)
After x Exposure 3.708* 7.783** 7.587*** 9.932*
(2.060) (3.193) (2.859) (5.120)
Exposure -4.274** -8.276*** -8.135*** -10.546**
(2.029) (3.187) (2.851) (5.007)
After x Entity Size -0.124
(0.134)
Entity Size -0.076* -0.044 0.045
(0.045) (0.052) (0.144)
Acquisition Deal Size -0.197*** -0.249*** -0.171** -0.166**
(0.050) (0.075) (0.067) (0.066)
Age 6.891** 6.117* 5.999*
(3.077) (3.282) (3.279)
Age2 0.018 0.075 0.081
(0.223) (0.239) (0.239)
Backward Citations 0.307*** 0.216** 0.218**
(0.091) (0.099) (0.099)
Constant 55.015*** 27.833* 28.907** 28.924**
(11.672) (14.883) (13.013) (12.989)
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPC Controls Yes No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.094 0.124 0.191 0.194
Notes: Linear probability model with Lifetime Forward Citations(Deal Quality) as dependent
variable. Robust standard errors clustered by deal level in parentheses. Please see the text and
appendix for variable definitions and normalization.
financial transactions of an intermediary to be able to reach an economically sound
conclusion regarding its impact on inventors. The current analysis, even if com-
plemented with additional data on financial transactions of an intermediary is still
going to be limited. Current analysis cannot reach any conclusions regarding the
implications of a change in patent enforcement regime. For example, what would
happen to the inventors’ income if court implements loser’s pay system? Answering
such questions requires the knowledge of trade and enforcement activities under the
new patent enforcement regime, which is a function of unobservable factor such as
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the bargaining power of the inventors vis-a-vis intermediary.
In order to compare alternative patent enforcement regimes and their impact
on outside options of inventors, it is necessary to know how intermediaries operates
and how does it react to the possible modifications to the patent system. To do
so, I develop and calibrate a dynamic game in the next section to answer these
questions.
1.4 Model
I develop a dynamic model played between an intermediary, an inventor, and a
licensee. Figure 1.1 provides a summary of the model. As figure 1.1 illustrates,
the model takes the patent enforcement system as given. The upstream market
consists of inventors and downstream market consists of licensees. The primary aim
of the model is to quantify the impact of alternative patent enforcement regimes
on inventors via the link between enforcement and patent trade market. The key
parameter in the model is the bargaining power of the inventors in negotiating
prices. This parameter help me to determine the costs and benefits of alternative
patent enforcement regimes on patent sale incentives and prices.
1.4.1 Baseline Model
Basic Setting The game has A< ∞ periods, a=1,2,..,A. The baseline model
includes three players an intermediary (N), firm (F) and licensee (l) and a patent
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Figure 1.1: Preview of the Model
InventorLitigate Keep
Sell
IntermediaryCourt
Patent Regimes
1. American System
2. Loser Pay System
3. Mixed System
Offer(Licensing Expertise)
Licensee
Licensing
Agreement
no
yes
(m). The model period represents the age of the patent and increases yearly.
The patent (m) is characterized by its intrinsic value ra, its distance to the
operations of the player i ρim, its utilization value to the player i (1 − ρim) × ra,
the number of firms working in similar technologies nm,a and a vector of preference
shocks {im,a} for i ∈ {F, l}. The licensee (l) is characterized by its revenue from
sales Rla and the number of ongoing cases in court nlcourt,a at a given period a. I
discuss the details of the player characteristics in the parametrization section.
Players and Strategies At the beginning of each period, the firm (F) observes
the characteristics of the patent {(1−ρFm)×ra, nm,a}, and the sale price of the patent
pm,a denoted by vector ΩFa = {(1− ρFm)× ra, nm,a, pm,a}. The determination of the
sale price is going to be discussed in detail in the next section. The action space of
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the firm in a given period a is selling(S) the patent to intermediaries (dFS,m ∈ {0, 1}),
keeping(K) the patent in the portfolio (dFK,m ∈ {0, 1}) or litigating(L) other firms
working on similar technologies (dFL,m ∈ {0, 1}). I assume that the firm’s strategy
depends on the firm-patent level characteristics and the sale price of the patent.
Hence, the strategy space of the firm is given by:
dFj,m : {1, ..., A} × R+ × N× R+ × R −→ {0, 1} for j ∈ {S,K,L} (1.4.1)
Here, dFS,m(a, (1 − ρFm) × ra, nm,a, pm,a, Fm,a) = 1 means that the firm’s action
is to sell the patent (m) to intermediaries at period a, while dFS,m(a, (1 − ρFm) ×
ra, nm,a, pm,a, 
F
m,a) = 0 means the firm does not sell the patent(m) to intermediaries
at period a. dFK,m(a, (1 − ρFm) × ra, nm,a, pm,a, Fm,a) = 1 means that the firm keeps
the patent in portfolio at period a. dFK,m(a, (1 − ρFm) × ra, nm,a, pm,a, Fm,a) = 0
means, on the other hand, the firm does not keep the patent in portfolio at period
a. Finally, dFL,m(a, (1 − ρFm) × ra, nm,a, pm,a, Fm,a) = 1 means that the firm litigates
other players in the market using the patent at period a while dFL,m(a, (1 − ρFm) ×
ra, nm,a, pm,a, 
F
m,a) = 0 means that the firm does not litigate any player in the
market at period a. At a given period a, the choice specific flow utility that the
firm (F) gets from the patent (m) with characteristics {(1− ρFm)× ra, nm,a, pm,a} is
denoted by a continuous and bounded function uFj ((1− ρFm)× ra, nm,a, pm,a, θ, Fm,a)
for j∈ {S,K,L}. The flow utility can be written as the sum of choice specific
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utilities:
uF ((1− ρFm)× ra, nm,a, pm,a, dFm, θ, Fm,a) =
∑
j∈{S,K,L} dFj,mu
F
j,m((1− ρFm)× ra, nm,a, pm,a, θ, Fm,a).
(1.4.2)
Please note that selling the patent to intermediaries is a terminal condition for
the firm. Once the firm sells the patent at period a, the flow utility of the patent to
the firm is zero at period a+1. Selling in this context means that the firm delegates
all its rights to use the patent to intermediaries. Note that this characterization
restricts the strategy space not to depend on history.
At the beginning of each period (a∗) after the sale of the patent to intermedi-
aries, intermediaries (N) observes the characteristics of the patent and the licensee(l)
denoted by vector Ωla? = {(1 − ρlm) × ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?}. The action space of in-
termediaries in a given period a? is enforcing (E) the patent against the licensee
(dNE,m ∈ {0, 1}) or waiting (W) for the next period (dNW,m ∈ {0, 1}).
dNj,m,l : {a?, ..., A} × R+ × R+ × N −→ {0, 1} for j ∈ {E,W} (1.4.3)
Here, dNE,m,l(a?, (1 − ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?) = 1 means that intermediaries’ ac-
tion is to enforce the patent against the licensee at period a? while dNE,m,l(a?, (1 −
ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?) = 0 means that intermediaries’ action is not to enforce the
patent against the licensee at period a. dNW,m(a?, (1 − ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?) = 1
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means that intermediaries’ action is wait at period a?.
dNW,m,l(a?, (1 − ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?) = 0 means, on the other hand, intermedi-
aries’ action is not to wait to enforce the patent against licensee at period a?.
Conditional on enforcing the patent (dNE,m = 1), intermediaries’ makes a take-
it-or-leave-it settlement offer (DN) to the licensee.
DNm,l : {a?, ..., A} × R+ × R+ × N× {0, 1} × {0, 1} −→ R+ (1.4.4)
Here, DNm,l(a?, (1−ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, dNW,m,l, dNE,,m,l) means that intermediaries’
action is to offer the settlement fee to the licensee for the patent at period a?.
After receiving the settlement offer from intermediaries, the licensee observes
Ωla? = {(1− ρlm)× ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?} and the preference shocks {lm,a?}. The action
space of the licensee in a given period is to take (T) the settlement offer (dlT,m ∈
{0, 1}) or to reject (R) the settlement offer (dlR,m ∈ {0, 1}) .
dlm : {a?, ..., A} × R+ × R+ × N× {0, 1} × {0, 1} × R −→ {0, 1} (1.4.5)
dlT,m(a?, (1 − ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, dNW,m,l, dNE,,m,l, DNm,l, lm,a?) = 1 means that the
licensee accept the settlement offer at period a? while
dlm(a?, (1 − ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, dNW,m,l, dNE,,m,l, DNm,l, lm,a?) = 0 means licensee does
not take the offer.
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dlR,m(a?, (1 − ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, dNW,m,l, dNE,,m,l, DNm,l, lm,a?) = 1 means that the
licensee rejects the offer in a given period a? while
dlR,m(a?, (1−ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, dNW,m,l, dNE,,m,l, DNm,l, lm,a?) = 0 means licensee does
not reject the offer in a given period a?.
The choice specific flow utility that intermediaries’ and the licensee get from the
patent at time a? are denoted by a continuous and bounded function uNj,m(a?, (1−
ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, DN , θ) for j∈ {E,W} and ulj,m(a?, (1−ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, θ, lm,a?)
for j∈ {T,R} respectively. The flow utilities that intermediaries and licensee get
from strategy profile b = {{dl.,m}, {dN.,m,l, DNm,l}} can be written as the sum of choice
specific utilities:
ul(a?, (1− ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?,b, θ, lm,a?) =
∑
j∈{T,R} dlj,mu
l
j,m(a?, (1− ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?,b−l, θ, lm,a?).
(1.4.6)
uN(a?, (1− ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, b, θ) =
∑
j∈{E,W} dNj,mu
N
j,m(a?, (1− ρlm)ra? , Rla? , nlcourt,a?, DN , b−N , θ).
(1.4.7)
Information Sets and Transition Let pi denote the stochastic evolution
of state variables {ra, Rla, nm,a, nlcourt,a} at period a, and Gi the distribution of
preference shocks for player i ∈ {F, l}. As for the information set of players at time
a, I assume that player i∈ {F, l} knows the distribution {pii,Gi} and the current
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draws. Player N observes {pii,Gi} for i ∈ {F, l}. The transition probabilities for
i ∈ {F, l} can be written as follows:
pi(ra+1, Rla+1, nm,a+1, nlcourt,a+1|ra, Rla, nm,a, nlcourt,a, θ) (1.4.8)
The functional form of the transition probabilities is discussed in detail in
parametrization section.
Terminal Value The life of the patent is defined over A periods. Hence, the
patent cannot generate any flow utility for any players after the age of A. This can
be defined formally as:
Definition 1. For every i∈ {F, l}: ui = 0 for a > A.
The other terminal value depends on the firm’s decision to sell the patent. Once
the firm sells its patent at period a∗, it cannot gain any flow utility from the patent
in the following periods, which can be written:
Definition 2. If dFS (a∗, .) = 1, then uF = 0 for a > a∗.
The last terminal value is concerning intermediaries’ decision to enforce the
patent. Once intermediaries enforce the patent against the licensee, it cannot en-
force the same patent against the same licensee in the future periods. Formally it
can be written as:
Assumption 1. If dNE,l(a∗, .) = 1 for licensee (l) and patent (m), then uN(Ωla, b, θ) =
0 for a > a∗.
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This assumption ensures that intermediaries are not going to enforce the patent
against the same licensee in the future conditional on having enforced the patent
against the same licensee before.
Figure 1.2: Time Line
t
Frealizes FandN negotiates p Firm chooses {dF}Intermediary chooses {dN , DN} l realizes Licensee chooses {dl}
t+1
State Transition(pi)
Decision Problems
Formally, I can state the decision problems of each player in the following fashion:
Problem of the Licensee The decision problem of licensee (l), given the strate-
gies of player N, is :
max
dlj(.)∈{0,1}
 ∑
j∈{T,R}
dlju
l
j(Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ, la)
. (1.4.9)
Problem of the Intermediaries The decision problem of the intermediaries
(N), given the strategies of player l, is:
max
{dNj (.),DN (.)}
 A+1∑
a=a?
βa−1E[
∑
j∈{E,W}
dNj u
N
j (Ωla, dl, DNl , θ)]
 (1.4.10)
where the expectation is taken over future state transitions and subsequent
characteristics.
Problem of the Firm The decision problem of the firm (F), given the strategies
of player N, is:
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max
dFj (.)
 A+1∑
a=1
βa−1E[
∑
j∈{S,K,L}
dFj u
F
j (ΩFa , θ, Fa )]
 (1.4.11)
where the expectation is taken over future state transitions and subsequent
characteristics.
Determination of Prices Given the strategies of players, price is determined
through Nash Bargaining. Specifically, it is:
max
pa
pa −∑a?+1a=1 (βa−1E[∑j∈{S,K,L} dF,?j uFj (ΩFa , θ, Fa )])
η ×
∑A+1
a=a? β
a−1E[∑j∈{E,W} dN,?j uNj (Ωla, dl,?, DN,?l , θ)]− pa)
1−η
(1.4.12)
where the expectation is taken over future state transitions and subsequent
characteristics.
Since the game is a finite horizon, incomplete information game, one can solve
it by backward induction.
Assumption 2. For any (Ωla, θ, la); ulT (Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ, la) is strictly decreasing in DN and
ulR(Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ, la) is constant in DN .
Assumption 2 ensures that increasing the settlement offer holding everything else
constant decreases the utility of taking the offer in the perspective of the licensee.
On the other hand, ulR being constant in DN means that rejecting the offer can be
seen as taking the outside option which does not depend upon the settlement offer.
Assumption 3. Assume ui be a concave and bounded function for all i∈ {F, l, N}.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 2, 3, player l has a cut-off strategy.
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Proof. Given the period a and the strategy of intermediaries, instantaneous utility
of taking the offer is given by:
ulT (Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ, la) (1.4.13)
The instantaneous utility of rejecting the settlement offer (DNl ) is given by:
ulR(Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ, la) (1.4.14)
Since ulT is concave and strictly decreasing, its inverse exists. Equating the in-
stantaneous utilities and inverting the function give us the cut-off value for accepting
the settlement offer.
ulT (Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ, la) = ulR(Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ, la) (1.4.15)
D¯N = δ(Ωla, dNl , θ, la) (1.4.16)
The strategy profile dl,? = {dl,?R , dl,?T } can be summarized as:
dl,∗R (a,Ωla, dNm,l, DNm,l, lm,a|d−l) =

1 if DNl ≥ D¯Nl
0 if DNl < D¯Nl
,
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dl,∗T (a,Ωla, dNm,l, DNm,l, lm,a|d−l) =

0 if DNl ≥ D¯Nl
1 if DNl < D¯Nl
,
Let Va be the expected utility of enforcing the patent for player N in period a:
Va = [P (T |a,Ωla, dNl , DNl )uNE (Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ) + P (R|a,Ωla, dNl , DNl )uNE (Ωla, dNl , DNl , θ)] (1.4.17)
Assumption 4. For any (Ωla, θ, dNl ): Va be strictly quasi-concave and bounded.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 4, there exist a unique DN,∗ which maximizes
Va.
Proof. The proof is standard and follows the uniqueness of the maximizer for the
strictly quasi-concave functions.
In the same fashion, I can characterize the optimal strategy of the player N.
Player N makes the settlement offer at period A that maximizes VA. Since patent
expires at period A+1, VA+1 = 0. Hence, player N enforces the patent in the last
period if
VA ≥ 0 (1.4.18)
At period A-1, player N enforces the patent today if expected utility of enforcing
today is larger than the expected discounted value of enforcing the patent tomorrow:
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VA−1 ≥ βE(VA) (1.4.19)
where the expectation is taken over the state variables and the time varying
licensee characteristics. The strategy profile for intermediaries dN,? = {dN,?E , dN,?W }
can be summarized as follows:
dN,∗E (a,ΩFa , dNm,l, D
N,∗
m,l |d−N) =

1 if Va ≥ βE(Va+1)
0 if Va < βE(Va+1)
,
dN,∗W (a,ΩFa , dNm,l, D
N,∗
m,l |d−N) =

0 if Va ≥ βE(Va+1)
1 if Va < βE(Va+1)
,
Suppose the firm has the patent with characteristics ΩFA. Since the patent expires
at period A+1, the future value of the patent to the firm is zero for every choice.
Hence, the value of the patent to the firm(F) at period A is
V FS,A =uFS (ΩFA, θ, FS,A) (1.4.20)
V FK,A =uFK(ΩFA, θ, FK,A) (1.4.21)
V FL,A =uFL(ΩFA, θ, FL,A) (1.4.22)
where V FS,A denotes the value of selling the patent with characteristics ΩFA at
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period A, V FK,A denotes the value of keeping the patent with characteristics ΩFA at
period A, and V FL,A denotes the value of litigating the patent with characteristics
ΩFA at period A.
The firm is going to choose the option with the highest value at period A. The
value of the optimal option is denoted (V FA ).
V FA = max{V FS,A, V FK,A, V FL,A} (1.4.23)
At period A-1, the firm makes the same decisions. The value of each option can
be stated in a similar fashion:
V FS,A−1 =uFS (ΩFA−1, θ, FS,A−1) (1.4.24)
V FK,A−1 =uFK(ΩFA−1, θ, FK,A−1) + βE[V FA (ΩFA|dFK,A−1 = 1)] (1.4.25)
V FL,A−1 =uFL(ΩFA−1, θ, FL,A−1) + βE[V FA (ΩFA|dFL,A−1 = 1)] (1.4.26)
where the values are equal to flow utility of each option plus the discounted value
of the future value of each option. Please note that if the firm sells the patent, its
continuation value is zero. As I indicated before, selling means the delegation of all
future rights of the patent to intermediaries.
In the same fashion, the value of the optimal option at period A-1 is
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V FA−1 = max{V FS,A−1, V FK,A−1, V FL,A−1} (1.4.27)
Since uF is a concave and bounded function, I can write the firm’s problem in
recursive form.
V Fa = max
dFj ∈{0,1}
 ∑
j∈{S,K,L}
{dFj uF (Ωa, dF , θ, Fj )}+ 1{dFj ∈{K,L}} × βE[V
F
a+1(Ωa+1|dFj )]
.
(1.4.28)
The optimal strategy of the firm dF,∗ = {dF,?K , dF,?S , dF,?L } can be written as follows:
dF,∗S (a,Ωa, FS ) =

1 if V F,Sa ≥ max{V F,Ka , V F,La }
0 if V F,Sa < max{V F,Ka , V F,La }
,
dF,∗K (a,Ωa, FK) =

1 if V F,Ka > max{V F,Ka , V F,La }
0 if V F,Ka ≤ max{V F,Sa , V F,La }
,
dF,∗L (a,Ωa, FL) =

1 if V F,La > max{V F,Sa , V F,Ka }
0 if V F,La ≤ max{V F,Sa , V F,Ka }
,
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 2, 3,4 , the sequential equilibrium of the game
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is unique where strategies are {dF,∗, dl,∗, dN,∗, DN,∗} and beliefs are consistent with
{pi,Gi} for all i ∈ {F, l} .
The idea behind uniqueness is simple. Inventors and intermediary solve a typ-
ical single-agent optimal stopping problem. Two optimal-stopping problems are
combined into sequential one such that intermediary solves the optimal stopping
problem of enforcement as soon as inventors reach their terminal condition. Notice
that, when deciding, due to the concavity and monotonicity assumptions and the
fact that players know the distribution of the characteristics and the evolution of
the state variables, they only have one action for each draw given their beliefs. It
constitutes the equilibrium of the game. No player has a profitable deviation as the
off-equilibrium action always provides at most as much utility as the equilibrium
action, given the beliefs.
1.4.2 Extension of the Model
For all practical purposes, the empirical application requires the game to be gen-
eralized for a larger number of players. The game has A< ∞, a=1,2,..,A. The
model includes the following players l∈ {1, ...,L}, F∈ {1, ...,F}, m∈ {1, ...,M} and
intermediaries(N).
Assumption 5. For any (l,F,m)∈ L×F×M : (l, F,m) and intermediaries(N) play
the baseline game defined in Definition 3 independently.
Here, independence means that strategies and payoffs of the players in different
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games do not affect each other. For example, the Firm (F)’s pay-off from keeping
the patent m is not going to influence the return of holding the patent m+1. It
has slightly different implications for the payoff structure of intermediaries. As the
game has only one intermediary, it can generate returns out of various licensees for
each patent. The intermediaries’ valuation of the patent is going to be the sum of
the utilities earned out of its interaction with each licensee. Its valuation is, in turn,
going to affect the pricing of the patents. Under Assumption 5, I can modify the
decision problem of intermediaries and the pricing as follows:
Problem of the Intermediaries The decision problem of the intermediaries
(N), given the strategies of player l, is:
max
dNj (.),DNl (.)
 L∑
l=1
A+1∑
a=a?
βa−1E[
∑
j∈{E,W}
dNj u
N
j (Ωla, dl, DNl , θ)]
 (1.4.29)
where the expectation is taken over future state transitions and subsequent
characteristics.
Pricing Given the strategies of players, price is determined through Nash Bar-
gaining. Specifically, it is:
max
pa
pa −∑a?+1a=1 βa−1E[∑j∈{S,K,L} dF,?j uFj (ΩFa , θ, Fa )])
η ×
∑L
l=1
∑A+1
a=a? β
a−1E[∑j∈{E,W} dN,?j uNj (Ωla, dl,?, DN,?l , θ)]− pa)
1−η
(1.4.30)
where the expectation is taken over future state transitions and subsequent
characteristics.
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1.4.3 Parametrization
Intrinsic Return ra denotes the period return of patent (m) with age a and
it follows log normal distribution at age zero and for a>0 it is distributed as the
following Markov Process(Ψ) at age a+1:
ra+1 =

0, with prob. exp(−θra)
max{δra, z}, with prob. 1− exp(−θra)
(1.4.31)
qa(z) =
1
φa−1σ
exp(− γ + z
φa−1σ
) (1.4.32)
This process has the following economic interpretation. At each age, agents
carry out experiments to increase the returns from their patented ideas. These
tests can potentially result in three different outcomes. First, tests may reveal
that the patented ideas can never generate any return. This event is realized with
probability exp(−θra). The second possible outcome is that the experiments do
not culminate in a more profitable use for the patented ideas in comparison to
the current one. In this case, current returns depreciate with δ. The last case
is that the experiments can reveal a profitable use for the patented ideas which
improves upon the current returns. The magnitude of the improvement on current
returns depends on the realization of z. This random variable has a two-parameter
exponential distribution. z has a density which declines at the constant rate φa−1σ.
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It means that probability of uncovering practical usage decreases with age.
The net value of the asset with age (a) to the firm is determined by the distance
of the idea (ρF ∈ [0, 1]) to the firm (F). The higher the distance, the lower the
utilization of ideas for the firm. I can write the net value of the patent to the firm
as:
(1− ρF )× ra (1.4.33)
The distance of ideas plays an important role for firms in deciding to sell their
patents to the other entities. Several studies show that controlling for all other
characteristics, the higher the distance, the greater the incentive to sell the patent.11
Please check variable construction section for the details of the empirical counterpart
of the measure.
Utilities I start by specifying expected utility function ui for each i∈ {F, l, N}.
uF =

(1− ρF )× ra − P T × Cd,a + FK,a, if dFK = 1
(1− P I)× (PwF × (∑k((1− ρk)× ra))− Cp,a − CId,a + FL,a, if dFL = 1
pa + FS,a, if dFS = 1
(1.4.34)
where P I is the probability that the patent is invalid. If the patent is invalid,
the firm cannot generate any current and future returns regardless of its choice.
11Please check Abrams et al. [2017] for details.
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(1 − ρF ) × ra is the expected net return of the patent to the firm. P T is the
probability that an entity is going to litigate the firm (F) by patent conflict. 1−P T
denotes the probability that the firm (F) is not targeted as a part of any dispute
in given period a. (1− P T )× Cd,a denotes the expected defense cost as a result of
being targeted in infringement dispute. FK,a is preference shock that firm observes
when it decides to keep the patent. (1− P I)× (1− ρF )× ra − P T × Cd,a + FK,a is
the utility of maintaining the patent in the portfolio for the firm (F).
Plaintiff faces the patent invalidity challenge when it enforces the patent in the
court. The invalidity disputes usually accompany patent enforcement cases. The
option to litigate should reflect these costs as well. CId,a is the cost of defending
itself in the invalidity dispute in the court, Cp,a is the cost of filing a complaint
against other players on the court at a given period a. Please note that litigation
option both includes Cp,a and CId,a because filing an infringement suit immediately
follows invalidity challenges. Thus, the firm is the plaintiff in infringement dispute
while the defendant in invalidity litigation. ρk measures the distance of firm F’s
patent to the firms (k) operating in the same technology space. The sum of the
net value of the patent over firm (k) yields the net value that can be captured by
the firm F. wF is a parameter that captures the probability that the firm (F) wins
the case. F,La is the choice specific preference shock for (L) at a given period a.
(1−P I)× (PwF × (∑k((1− ρk)× ra))−Cp,a−CId,a + FL,a is the utility of enforcing
the patent in the court.
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The utility of selling the patent to intermediaries is just the sum of the selling
price and the preference shock, which is pa + FS,a.
I specify linear choice specific utility for licensees and intermediaries(N) in the
same fashion.
ul =

β1D
N + β2Rla + β3ncourt + lT , if dlT = 1
−(1− P I)× (PwN × (1− ρl)× ra)− Cd,a + lR, if dlR = 1
(1.4.35)
uN =

DN , if {dlT , dNE , DN} = {1, 1, DN}
(1− P I)× (PwN × (1− ρl)× ra)− Cp,a − CId,a, if {dlR, dNE , DN} = {1, 1, DN}
0, if dlT ∈ {0, 1}, dNW = 1
(1.4.36)
where DN is the settlement offer made by intermediaries, PwN is the probability
that intermediaries wins when the case resolved in the court. −β1DN + β2Rla +
β3ncourt + lT is the utility of accepting settlement offer(D) for licensee(l). −(1 −
P I) × (PwN × (1 − ρl) × ra) − Cd,a + lR is the utility of rejecting the offer(D) for
licensee(l). DN is the utility of settling the case outside the court for intermediaries.
(1− P I)× (PwN × (1− ρl)× ra)−CId,a −Cp,a is the utility of resolving the case in
the court for intermediaries.
Please note that {P I , P T} are random variables drawn from a binomial distri-
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bution with means imputed from the data and they are realized after decisions have
been made.
Preference Shocks The choice specific preference shocks ia for each player i
∈ {F, l} are iid over time and distributed as Extreme Value Type I.
Transitions Licensee specific revenues follow AR(1) process.
Rla = c+ ϕRla + a for a = 1, ..., A (1.4.37)
The number of entrants follows Poisson distribution.
f(nm) =
λnmentrye
−λentry
nm!
(1.4.38)
The number of ongoing court cases follows a Poisson distribution.
f(ncourt) =
λncourtcourt e
−λcourt
ncourt!
(1.4.39)
1.4.4 Discussion
In this section, some important issues related to the patents and the theoretical
model will be discussed.
First, the model abstracts away from the patent trade between innovating firms.
When intermediaries offer the price for a patent, it does not face competition from
innovating firms. Even though patent sale transactions between the firms can have
42
an impact on intermediaries’ activities, the patent trade patterns of intermediaries
and innovating firms exhibit stark differences. Akcigit et al. [2015] finds that the
market for patents exhibits search costs and the innovating firms use the market
for productive purposes. In other words, the firms try to find better ideas through
patent agents to utilize under their business plan. Moreover, intermediaries data in
this chapter shows that the firms having a transaction record with intermediaries
do not use secondary markets extensively. This indicates that the functions of
secondary markets for the innovating firms and the intermediaries are different. As
the primary aim of this chapter is to understand the effect of the intermediaries on
patent trade and enforcement, I abstract away from transactions between firms and
their potential impact acquisitions of intermediaries.
The theoretical framework implies that the licensees do not have the option
to buy the patents directly from the firms. Two reasons can justify this implicit
assumption. First, finding the right patent for enforcement requires expertise and
the skill to interpret the technical language of patent claims as well as the ability
to map them to the consumer products. This requires substantial investment in
expertise. The professional intermediaries combine big legal teams with industry
experts to construct massive patent portfolios using the secondary markets. The
literature shows that this option is limited for operating firms. Specifically, Ak-
cigit et al. [2015] indicates that transactions among companies are for productive
purposes. Moreover, Serrano [2010] suggests that the most of the patent transfers
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occur between small firms. Licensees are big firms. They rely upon in-house R
&D to construct their patent portfolios. This observation suggests that firms, thus
intermediary licensees, do not use the secondary market for ideas extensively to
complement their patent portfolios.
In a nutshell, the abstraction implies that the intermediary has the expertise, but
the licensees do not have the expertise in finding the right patents in the secondary
markets. On top of that, since intermediaries operates in disguise, licensees have
little opportunity to anticipate intermediaries’ strategy and buy the patents before
intermediaries do. The implicit assumption of the model implies that licensees have
to negotiate with intermediaries instead of anticipating their approach and buy the
patents to avoid potential conflict. Given the empirical findings in the literature and
the structure of the patent trade market, the negotiation structure between licensees
and intermediaries capture the essential features of the patent enforcement market.
The expertise channel that the model implicitly implies can be achieved ex-
plicitly by adding costly search in the model. Suppose the licensee may search for
patents that the intermediary plans to target for acquisition. First, since the licensee
does not have any information regarding how intermediaries select the patents, the
probability that intermediaries buy the patent is minuscule. Assume firm can draw
random patents from the universe by paying the search cost and the price. Since the
probability that intermediaries target the patent is very low, expected return from
buying the patent is more likely to be negative. Given the low expected return,
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the licensee decides not to purchase the patent endogenously. Thus, adding this
additional layer does not change theoretical results of the model.
Second, the model implies that the firms do not have the option to settle the
case outside the court. Empirical evidence regarding in-house firm licensing activ-
ity suggests that in-house licensing is not a well-developed market. The in-house
licensing corresponds to 10 percent of the R&D expenditures of the firms. 12 The
rate is much lower for the small firms. Lanjouw and Schankerman [2001] finds
that small firms are more likely to end up in court during licensing negotiations.
Considering the low rate of in-house licensing together with the increased visibility
of small firms in court, one can say that small firms do not have the bargaining
power to settle the cases outside the court. Much of the firms transacted with the
intermediaries are small ones. 13 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that they do not
have the bargaining power to settle the cases outside the court.
An obvious extension of the model can include the choice of settling the cases
outside the court for the innovating firms. This option is less likely to be utilized
by small firms as their capacity to enforce the patents outside the court are limited.
Since small firms constitute the majority of the transactions with intermediaries,
adding this option in the model is not going to change the value of the options they
have. Thus, the main implications of the model are going to remain the same.
Third, the model implicitly assumes that intermediaries are the only entity buy-
12Please check https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-returns-of-active-corporations-table-1 for
further reference.
13Abrams et al. [2017] shows that small firms comprise seventy percent
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ing and enforcing patents in the market. Intermediaries in this study construct
significant patent portfolios and specializes in certain technology fields. Compe-
tition among different intermediaries is ignored and not the primary focus of this
analysis. One should keep in mind that different business plans may coexist in the
same market.
1.5 Identification and Calibration, Model Fit
1.5.1 Identification
I present heuristic arguments for the identification of model parameters. The
bargaining power of the inventors in upstream pricing negotiations are identified
through the choice of entities with distant ideas and the Supreme Court Decision.
Since entities with distant ideas do not have the option to enforce their patents in
the court due to their lack of expertise, their choice is restricted to keep or sell the
patent. An exogenous change in tougher standards on preliminary injunction grant
is going to affect the acquisition prices only through its impact on intermediaries’
valuation depending on the relative bargaining power of intermediaries. Such a
change in acquisition fees resulting from enforcement costs help me to recover the
bargaining power of intermediaries in the upstream market. Ideally one can identify
the bargaining parameter via indirect inference approach by targeting the differen-
tial decline in acquisition prices as a result of higher enforcement standards.14
14Due to computational burden of the procedure, indirect inference approach is not implemented
in this analysis.
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Now I discuss the identification of parameters governing patent value distribu-
tion. I identify the value distribution from patent acquisition and licensing trans-
action in both markets. Since I observe two transactions at different ages for the
same patent, it gives me the the power to identify the age-dependent parameters of
the Markov distribution.
Last but not the least, identification of enforcement capacity of upstream entities
comes from the variation in the proximity of the idea to the entrants and patent
owners in the upstream market. Since the distance of the idea to the patent holders
portfolio is fixed over time, the time series variation on the number of entrants and
proximity of the idea to entrants changes the return to enforce the idea in the court
relative to keeping it in the portfolio.
1.5.2 Calibration
Since I do not observe the intrinsic value of the patents from the real data, given
the parameter values, I need to simulate the value paths for each patent before
solving the model. Then, using these value paths, and a parameter guess, the
model is solved backward in the upstream and downstream market simultaneously.
Model is calibrated using the simulated method of moments. For a given vector
of parameters, the model generates simulated data and fit the empirical moments
generated by the real data.
For the calibration of the model, I discipline intermediaries in my model using
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the Abrams et al. [2017] data that comes from some NPEs. I restrict my sample to
the most essential patents15 in licensing deals. The sample covers the period early
2000s until 2014. I also focus my attention on the patents relevant to intermediary
data.
I denote the vector of model parameters by Θ. I group all of the model-simulated
moments into the vector H˜(Θ) and the data moments into the vector H. I minimize
the objective function [H˜(Θ) − H]′W [H˜(Θ) − H], where W is a diagonal weight
matrix. As weights, I use the inverse of the variance of the data moments.
15The most relevant patents have higher ranks in the deal. I focus my attention on the most
important patents.
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1.6 Empirical Results
I report the calibrated parameters in Table 1.4. Some of the model parameters can
be easily interpreted, and I discuss them in turn. The probability that intermediary
wins the case at court is calibrated to be 0.701 while the probability that firm wins
the case at court is 0.145. The point estimates imply that intermediaries have a
comparative advantage in patent enforcement relative to the innovating firms and
inventors.
The point estimate of β2 implies that the higher the revenue is, it is more likely
that target firm fights at court.
The calibrated parameter that governs the bargaining power of intermediaries
in the upstream market shows that intermediaries has substantial market power in
price negotiations.
The results indicate that intermediaries can have significant profit margins due
to their market power in both markets. Therefore, the total impact on market
equilibrium is explored in the next section.
The success of the model in matching empirical moments is presented in Table
1.6. The model can replicate mean prices; however, there is a slight difference
between model and data for average patent age moments.
1. Average Acquisition Price: I normalize mean acquisition price to 1 to be in
accord with the confidentiality restrictions. Please note that acquisition prices
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Table 1.4: Parameters In the Model
.
Parameter
Description Notation Parametrization Source
i.Calibrated In the Model
Probability of Winning PWF ,PWN
Preference Parameters β1, β2, β3
Bargaining Power η
Value Distribution θ, φ, σ, δ
ii.Calibrated Outside the Model
Invalidity Exposure P I Binomial Distribution Lex Machina
Extra Litigation Exposure P T Binomial Distribution Lex Machina
Preference Shocks FS ,FK , FL , lT , lL EV type 1 with scale 1
Discount Factor β 0.9
Product Revenue c,ϕ AR(1) Compustat
Entrants λentrant Poisson Distribution Patent Citation Data
Court Filings by Firms λCourt Poisson Distribution Lex Machina
Enforcement Costs Cp, Cd Log Normal Distribution Lex Machina
Table 1.5: Calibration Results
.
Parameter Estimates
PWF 0.145
PWN 0.701
β1 -0.678
β2 -0.011
β3 0.001
η 0.266
θ 0.741
φ 0.378
σ 50.212
δ 0.923
are recorded at acquisition deal level.
2. Average Licensing Price for non-litigation License and Litigation License:
The licensing revenue of each patent is calculated based on licensing rev-
enue type. Then I aggregate it for each acquisition deal. Licensing price is
normalized relative to the average acquisition price.
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Table 1.6: Calibration Target Moments
Target Data Model
Average Acquisition Price 1 1
Average Licensing Price for non-Litigation License 1.50 1.451
Average Licensing Price for Litigation License (Intermediary) 1.80 1.732
Average Damages Awarded to Firms at Court 1.35 1.30
Correlation between Acquisition Price and Distance -0.0510 -0.0435
Correlation between Acquisition Price and Licensing Price 0.3150 0.301
Fraction of non-Litigation License(Intermediary) 0.701 0.682
Fraction of Cases Brought Up by Firms 0.011 0.003
Fraction of Patents Sold to Intermediaries 0.0121 0.0521
Average Patent Acquisition Age(Intermediary) 8.2 4.812
Average Patent Age at Licensing for non-Litigation License 12.4 16.240
Average Patent Age at Licensing Deal for Litigation License(Intermediary) 14.320 15.1
Average Patent Age for Court Cases(Firm) 10.2 6.467
Notes: The most valuable patents in licensing negotations are used to calculate the correlations,
prices and characteristics.
3. Average Damages Awarded to Firms at Court: The damages awarded at
court for firms is calculated using Lex Machina data set. Average Damages
Awarded is normalized relative to the average acquisition price.
4. Correlation between Acquisition Price and Distance: I calculate the corre-
lation between Acquisition Prices and Distance to the licensee at acquisition
deal level for intermediary patents.
5. Correlation between Acquisition Price and Intermediary Licensing Price: I
calculate the correlation between intermediary acquisition prices and licensing
price. Intermediary licensing price includes both both non-litigation license
and litigation license at acquisition deal level for intermediary patents.
6. Fraction of non-litigation License: This moment measures the mean fraction
of cases licensed to the licensees without any court involvement.
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7. Fraction of Cases Brought Up by Firms: This moment measures the fraction
of patents brought up by firms relative to their portfolio size.
8. Fraction of Patents Sold to Intermediary: This moment measures the mean
fraction of firms patents sold to intermediaries
9. Average Patent Age at Licensing Deals for non-litigation Licensing: I calcu-
lated the mean age at the time of licensing for the cases settled outside the
court.
10. Average Patent Age at Licensing Deal for Litigation License(Intermediary):
I calculated the mean patent age for intermediary’s patents at the time of
licensing for the cases settled at court.
11. Average Patent Age for Court Cases(Firm): I calculated the mean patent age
for patents ended up at court at the time in which firms file infringement
complaints.
In order to show how intermediary enforcement changes with respect to different
parameter values, I simulated 1,000 patents at the calibrated value of the param-
eters. The results show that intermediaries is able to collect higher fees if licensee
has a preference towards early settlement. In line with this result, larger fraction
of the cases are resolved outside the court. Intuition behind this result is simple.
An increase in β1 means that the licensee is willing to pay more for settlement over
going to the court. Intermediaries’ charge higher prices for the licensee’s preference
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for the settlement by considering the trade-off between the increase in settlement
offer and the reduction in choice probability.
I also explore the impact of intermediary’s enforcement technology on the frac-
tion of cases settled outside the court and the fee they collect from the licensees.
The results show that improvement in intermediary’s enforcement technology re-
sults in an increase in settlement fees collected and the fraction of cases settled
outside the court. The intuition behind the results is simple. An increase in in-
termediary’s enforcement technology makes the option to go to the court is more
expensive than not going to the court, intermediaries can re-optimize by considering
the trade-off between the increase in settlement offer and the reduction in choice
probability. Results show that the settlement offer is more likely to get accepted
after the increase in PN .
Figure 1.3: Comparative Statistics I
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Figure 1.4: Comparative Statistics II
1.7 Policy Analysis
In this section, using the calibrated parameter values, several counterfactuals are
conducted to understand the impact of alternative patent enforcement regimes on
inventors. The quantitative analysis tries to explore the conditions and the patent
enforcement system under which litigation fees paid in equilibrium decrease and
inventors receive better prices in the patent sale market. Briefly, I would like to
answer the following questions: Given the structural parameters of the model, what
would happen to the transaction costs and inventor compensation if British Rule
of patent enforcement regime is implemented in the market in comparison to the
case in which American rule is implemented. Who benefits and losses? My answers
to the questions above regarding the market micro-structure help me to propose
potential policies which may have a tangible impact on inventors and affect patent
enforcement and trade.
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I consider the effects of different patent enforcement regimes on average inventor
income, average transaction costs, average profits of intermediaries. To measure the
effects on inventor compensation, I calculated average compensation that inventors
receive from trade and enforcement in the presence of intermediaries under different
regimes using the calibrated parameters. In the same fashion, I calculate the total
licensing fees paid by target firms per patent under alternative regimes to calculate
the effect on profits of intermediaries.
Table 1.7: Comparison of Alternative Patent Enforcement Systems
No Intermediary British Intermediary
World Rule Pays-all Rule
Change in Average Inventor Income -15.23% -2% -2.5%
Change in Average Transaction Costs 7.46% 2.5% 3.5%
Change in Average Intermediary Profits -3% -4.2%
Empirical results indicates that intermediaries have comparative advantage in
enforcement and reduce transaction costs in the market. They share the surplus
with the inventors. Table 1.7 presents the results of the counterfactual analysis. The
impact of British Rule and intermediary-pays-all rule and the counterfactual world
without intermediaries is evaluated relative to the current system. Quantitative
experiment suggests that in the no-intermediary world average transaction costs
increases by 7.46 percent and average inventor income decreases by 15.23 percent.
The key takeaway from the empirical results is that policies aiming at curtailing
intermediary activity and profits can result in an increase in transaction costs and a
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decrease in inventor earnings. Specifically, intermediary-pays-all rule culminates in
reducing the average inventor income by 2.5 percent, increase transaction costs by
3.5 percent and decrease average profits by 4.2 percent in comparison to the current
system. British Rule results in reducing the average inventor income by 2 percent,
increase transaction costs by 2.5 percent and decrease average profits by 3 percent
in comparison to the current system.
Intuition behind these results are simple. British Rule and intermediary-pays-
all Rule increase the expected value of going to court for licensing entities. In the
current system, each party has to pay their own litigation costs while under British
Rule, loser pays the full cost of litigation and, under intermediary-pays-all Rule,
intermediary pays all litigation fees if they are in dispute with innovating entities.
This leads to a decline in expected litigation cost for licensees and inventors. Such
a decline has two consequences. First, it leads to a decline in settlement fees that
intermediary charges to the licensees, which is translated into lower profits for inter-
mediaries. Second, lower profits for intermediaries lead to a decrease in acquisition
price that intermediary offers to the inventors. Thus, inventors on the margin choose
to litigate by themselves instead of transferring their assets to intermediaries. It
decreases the income that inventors are able to generate out of their assets. Please
note that there is no binding liquidity constraints for the inventors in the model in
any regimes. The existence of such constraints can have a direct impact on revenue
generated by enforcement. For example, even if enforcement has positive return on
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expectation for inventors, inventors may not be able to finance litigation costs and
sell their assets. Thus, the lack of such constraints in my model can overestimate
litigation fees paid by inventors and underestimate the benefits of NPEs on inven-
tors. Key take away from the mechanism is the following: Policies that increase the
litigation costs for the intermediaries decrease the outside option of the inventors
and may lead to an increase in litigation by inventors.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter provides new insights on the role of alternative patent enforcement
regimes on inventors’ outside options. I establish a strong link between patent trade
and enforcement costs. Specifically, I show that the increase in enforcement costs
push small firms and inventors to sell their assets to intermediaries at a lower price.
Intermediaries target higher quality assets after an increase in enforcement costs.
This chapter provides a new structural model of patent enforcement and trade in the
presence of intermediaries to evaluate the impact of alternative patent enforcement
regimes. The key feature of the model is that it connects enforcement activity
of intermediaries and patent trade to evaluate the potential effects of alternative
patent enforcement regimes on inventors.
Empirical results show that intermediaries have a comparative advantage in en-
forcement and reduce transaction costs in the market. My research demonstrates
that intermediaries share the surplus with the inventors. The quantitative experi-
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ment suggests that in the no-intermediary world, average transaction costs increase
by 7.46 percent and average revenue generated by inventors decreases by 15.23 per-
cent. The key takeaway from the results is that application of different costs for each
agent in the market yields dramatic results. A policy change where enforcement
costs decrease for inventors and increase for the intermediaries leads to excessive
enforcement by less capable entities. Furthermore, the policy change leads to higher
litigation fees paid in equilibrium and lowers the inventors’ gains.
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2 Chapter 2: Patent Trolls: Benign Middle-
man or Stick-Up Artists?16
2.1 Introduction
Are Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs)17 good or bad for technological progress? This
longstanding question has gained renewed urgency with their recent proliferation.
Advocates and opponents are often vehement, with strongly-held (and sometimes
self-interested) views. Concern about potential negative effects of NPEs has led to
the introduction of legislation in state legislatures and Congress aimed at curtailing
their activity. This view of NPEs as “stick-up artist” holds that they provide no
benefits, but simply amass patents and literally hold up companies using the threat
of litigation to extract rents. In the meantime, legislative efforts have been repelled
by advocates who hold that NPEs can provide positive benefits akin to market
intermediaries found in a range of industries. According to this view of NPEs
as “benign middleman,” these firms facilitate innovation by buying patents from
inventors who are not well-positioned to fully utilize their invention and selling or
16This chapter is based on research that I conducted with David S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit.
17I define an NPE broadly as a firm whose primary source of revenue is from patent licensing
fees or patent litigation awards. In Section 2.2 I discuss the relationship with related terms such
as patent assertion entities (PAEs) or patent trolls.
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licensing them through their large network of industrial companies.
Despite the popularity and importance of the subject, the inner workings of
NPEs has remained a mystery and discussions about them have, with few excep-
tions, been based on anecdotal evidence. This is largely due to the fact that NPEs
act in secrecy, making it harder for researchers to access micro data on their direct
business transactions and paid prices. The goal of my work is to help inform this
important debate and to move closer to understanding whether NPEs facilitate to
or harm innovation, or both.
This chapter makes two major contributions in the understanding of NPEs. I
develop a model of innovation that incorporates NPEs and makes testable predic-
tions. I am able to test the model by use of a proprietary and previously unstudied
dataset with detailed financial, transaction and technological information on tens
of thousands of NPE-held patents. Like the innovating firms I study, I do so by
building on prior work that has developed important metrics for patents, such as lit-
igation risk [Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001] and patent distance [Akcigit et al.,
2015], which quantifies the technological similarity between patents or groups of
patents.
I find a number of pieces of evidence, with some supporting the benign mid-
dleman perspective and others pointing towards the stick-up artist. I first consider
what motivates inventors to sell to NPEs. Innovating firms can capitalize on their
patents in a few primary ways: by producing a product, by selling to a better-
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situated producer, or by suing an infringer. As with all markets, secondary markets
for innovations may suffer from informational problems: since the inventor has lim-
ited information about potential users, they often cannot license or sell their patents
even if they wish to do so. This informational problem can lead to a misallocation
of innovation. One way to address the problem is to use patent intermediaries or
NPEs. As Lamoreaux and Sokoloff [2002] describe, trade is facilitated by these
intermediaries due to their ability to reduce search costs from years of accumulated
information about market participants on both sides. Another important way NPEs
can increase returns to inventors is by capitalizing on their substantial financial and
legal resources to enforce infringed patents.
Both of these features will be of greater importance to smaller innovating firms
and in fact I find empirically that small inventors are more likely to sell to NPEs.
I also find a significantly greater share of patents that are likely to be litigated are
sold to NPEs. Since firms are more likely to produce a product based on a patent
that is closer to the core business, it is also not surprising that I find the likelihood
of sale to an NPE to be greater for more peripheral patents.
I also explore the business model of the profit-maximizing NPE by attempting
to understand the determinants of the price NPEs pay for patents. Unlike the like-
lihood of sale, I find that the smaller firms are paid less than larger firms that sell
their patents to the NPEs; this corroborates one of the predictions of my bargain-
ing model between NPEs and innovating firm. I also find that patents that are
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more distant from innovating firm portfolios command a lower price, which also
corresponds to the model prediction.
The other half of a NPE business model is the licensing of patents to one or
multiple firms. Here I find that licensees are willing to pay more for patents with
higher litigation risk, holding everything else equal. Moreover, I find that licensing
fees increase in the goodness of fit to the licensee: the less distant the patent is, the
more the licensee is willing to pay. This supports the benign middleman theory that
NPEs are providing greater value when they facilitate the reallocation of patents
where they can be more useful.
Finally, I seek to understand the impact of NPEs on subsequent or downstream
innovation in fields with NPE activity. Specifically, I examine the impact of NPE
patent acquisition on forward citations, comparing citation behavior before and
after acquisition. I find a statistically significant decline in forward citations after
NPEs acquire patents, which provides some evidence for the stick-up artist theory.
Taken together, the evidence in this chapter is mixed and does not solely support
the benign middleman or the stick-up artist theory. Rather it suggests that there
are some aspects of NPEs that may increase innovation and some that may not.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief summary
of recent research as well as some institutional detail. In Section 2.3 I present my
model of innovation with NPEs and in Section 2.4 I introduce the data analyzed.
The main empirical results are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents a
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calibration exercise. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background
Since the terms patent troll, NPE, and patent assertion entity (PAE) are frequently
used to denote similar or overlapping things, it is useful to have a clear definition
of what I study, as well as a sense of the history of these entities in the U.S. I
define an NPE broadly as a firm whose primary source of revenue is from patent
licensing fees or patent litigation awards. This can include a large array of entities,
from individual inventors who do not practice their inventions, to shell companies
that file hundreds of lawsuits, to universities, to patent aggregators whose primary
revenues come from licensing fees. Some use the term PAE almost synonymously
to NPE, but excluding entities that perform research, such as universities (and
potential inventors who still invent). “Patent Troll” seems to be used to refer to
any type of entity the user of the term doesn’t like. Certainly included in this
would be the related group of legal entities that issued demand letters to hundreds
of businesses using networked scanners to email documents 18.
I will use the term NPE in this chapter and focus on the final category of NPE
- large firms that purchase patents and primarily license them or litigate when
they cannot license. I focus on this category for several reasons. First, these are
the types of NPEs receiving the most attention from the media and legislatures
in recent years. The attention is for a reason -there is less historical precedent
18See http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners/
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for them (see below) and they are the most interesting case because there are
plausible positive and negative attributes. Second, university licensing is unlikely
to be outlawed and almost all can agree that suing small businesses for scanning
documents is unproductive. But the impact on innovation of large entities that
generate substantial revenues from licensing fees and litigation is less clear. Finally,
these firms are likely making the biggest impact on markets for innovation.
2.2.1 Related Literature
Several others have made empirical investigations of NPEs, all subject to various
data limitations, since direct data was unavailable. On the theoretical side, much of
the work has been policy-focused and descriptive, and not relying on formal models.
Some studies attempt to measure the impact of NPE assertions outside of the
courtroom, drawing data not just from claims litigated to finality. In a well-known
study, Bessen and Meuer [2014] utilized survey data gathered by RPX, a risk-
management company helping firms deal with patent litigation. There was no
random sampling; RPX invited 250 firms to participate in the survey, of which only
82 provided information on lawsuits, and 46 provided information on non-litigation
assertions (such as demand letters). Bessen and Meuer [2014] concluded from this
limited sample that NPE assertions resulted in $29 billion in direct costs, dispropor-
tionately burdening smaller and medium-sized companies. Similarly, Chien [2014]
relied on nonrandom survey responses and a database, curated by RPX, of patent
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cases to conclude that most defendants in NPE suits are smaller companies. Feld-
man and Lemley [2015] polled in-house attorneys at companies that produced prod-
ucts in various industries, concluding that NPE demands did not lead to more inno-
vation. And Lu [2012] studied royalty rates paid in 46 transactions involving NPEs
using information from vendors that aggregate royalty rates primarily drawn from
companies’ public SEC filings. Lu [2012] found the royalty rates paid to NPEs as
similar to those paid to practicing entities.
Some scholars, including Schwartz and Kesan [2014], have questioned the validity
of such sweeping conclusions based on data that is potentially unrepresentative and
unreliable. There may be an overemphasis on technology firms, and there are also
varying definitions of what constitutes an NPE.
Another strain of research focuses solely on litigated cases, deriving informa-
tion on NPE activity from awarded damages or whether an asserted patent is found
invalid. Ashtor et al. [2014] rejected the notion NPE litigation activity differs signif-
icantly from practicing entity patent assertions. They examined over 1,750 patent
cases litigated to a verdict, and found little difference in outcomes between NPEs
and practicing entities. Cohen et al. [2014] used proprietary data from PatentFree-
dom, another company that aggregates litigation data, in arguing that NPEs are
more likely to target cash-rich firms. And Cotropia et al. [2014] hand-coded infor-
mation about the litigants in all patent infringement lawsuits filed in 2010 and 2012,
concluding that the hype about the dangers posed by NPE litigation is overblown.
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But assessing the aggregate economic effect of NPEs by only analyzing litigation
may underestimate their impact, since many assertions are theorized to take place
outside the scope of publicly accessible records; instead, NPEs may rely on extract-
ing licensing royalties, much of which is contractual and not subject to public dis-
closure. Risch [2012] attempted to defend the decision not to include non-litigation
data in a study of the 10 most litigious NPEs by asserting that it is more likely that
litigious NPEs’ activities incur greater social costs. Though it is true that litigation
is itself an additional potential cost, that is not proof of anything relating to the
relative costs of litigation versus non-litigation NPE assertions.
Fischer and Henkel [2012] adopted a wholly different tack, analyzing NPE patent
acquisitions by first identifying NPEs are using public searches and newspapers,
blogs, websites, then searching patent assignment databases for arrive at a sample
of patent acquisitions by NPEs. Using proxy indicators for various characteristics of
the acquired patents, Fischer and Henkel [2012] conclude that NPE-acquired patents
are likely to be higher-quality and of broader scope and application than non-NPE
patents. But the study is handicapped by the quality of the proxy variables; for
instance, the authors use international patent classification (IPC) classes, a highly
subjective taxonomical exercise to identify potential applications of the patent ex
ante, as a proxy for patent scope. In a clever study, Galasso and Schankerman [2014]
instead used patent assignment, litigation, and tax data for the period spanning
1983-2001, finding that NPEs play an insubstantial role in buying or litigating
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patents owned by individuals.
Previous papers that discuss the impact of NPEs on subsets of the economy
include Tucker [2014a,b], which cross-reference the names of frequent plaintiffs in
patent cases using the PatentFreedom database of known NPEs; this is the same
database Hagiu and Yoffie [2013] use. Tucker [2014b] explores the effects on the
healthcare information technology sector by measuring the impact of litigation by
one purported NPE, Acacia, who had acquired two patents that would make patient
data electronically available for remote access by physicians. Tucker [2014b] found
a large supply-side reduction in sales of the defendants software products that were
allegedly infringed by Acacia’s patents when compared to the defendants’ other
products that did not fall under the scope of the asserted patents. Similarly, firms
not targeted by Acacia that sold similar software products to the Acacia defendants’
allegedly infringed software did not see a drop in sales. Additionally, Tucker [2014a]
finds that patent litigation and venture capital investment follow an inverted U-
shaped relationship. Tracking the effects of litigation of PatentFreedom identified
NPEs on entire capital funding, The author found that high levels of patent litiga-
tion was correlated with decreased total venture capital in the region the litigation
was filed. The author of both papers acknowledges potential robustness issues with
her methodology that reduce the ability to draw conclusions from either study.
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2.2.2 Institutional Setting
This section gives more background on how the NPEs I study operate. As mentioned
above, the source of the data I use cannot be representative of all NPEs because
there are too many different business models.
Patents are acquired, usually in small groups from individuals or firms; these
are almost always the original assignees. The patents are almost always purchased
outright, although in rare occasions there can be subsequent compensation or rights
to future revenue. Almost all of the NPEs revenues derive from subsequent licensing
of patents. Patents are usually licensed for multiple years in large portfolios. Patent-
specific revenues are determined from licensing deals based on the prominence that
each patent played in the licensing negotiation. Occasionally the NPEs litigate over
infringement claims, although this leads to a small share of overall revenues.
2.3 Model
In this section, I build a tractable model of production with innovation to help
understand the role NPEs play in the market for innovation. By examining the
decision to sell to or license from an NPE I hope to find evidence that can test
the stick-up artist and benign middleman views of NPEs. The model generates a
number of predictions about how patent and firm characteristics, such as patent fit
(distance), litigation risk, and firm size impact these decisions. This provides the
framework that will guide my empirical analysis.
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Basic Environment Consider the following simple economy represented by a
unit circle C, as in Figure 2.1a. There are many intermediate-good-producing firms
that are located along that unit circle, each of which produces a differentiated good
i. A unique final good is produced from a combination of all these intermediate
goods as follows: Y = 11−σ
∫
C q
σ
i k
1−σ
i di, where ki denotes the quantity and qi the
quality of intermediate good i used in final good production. The final-good sector
operates with perfect competition and I normalize the price of the final good to 1
without loss of any generality. Therefore the objective function in the final-good
sector is simply:
max
ki
{ 1
1− σ
∫
C
qσi k
1−σ
i di−
∫
C
Pikidi
}
, ∀i ∈ C.
where Pi is the price of variety i. This maximization problem delivers the following
demand function for each intermediate good i:
Pi = qσi k−σi . (2.3.1)
A single perfectly enforceable patent for each leading-edge technology is held by
a firm, which can produce it at constant marginal cost ψ in terms of the unique final
good. Each monopolist firm chooses price and quantity to maximize profits on its
product line taking the demand in (2.3.1) into account. The profit-maximization
problem of the firm with leading-edge technology for intermediate good i can then
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Figure 2.1: Model Economy, Unit Circle C
r = 1/pi
Firm k
Firm i
(a) Example of Two Firms i and k
r = 1/pi
dkdi
Firm k
Firm i
Patent z
(b) Two Firms and a Patent z
be written as
Π (qi) = max
ki≥0
{
qσi k
1−σ
i − ψki
}
.
The first-order condition of this maximization problem implies a constant markup
over marginal cost, P (qi) = ψ/(1 − σ), and thus k (qi) =
[
(1−σ)
ψ
] 1
σ qi. Equilibrium
profits for a product line with technology qi are
Π (qi) = piqi, (2.3.2)
where pi ≡ σ [(1− σ) /ψ] 1−σσ .
The usual firm size proxies, such as profits Π (qi) = piqi and sales P (qi) k (qi) =
[(1− σ) /ψ] 1−σσ qi both increase linearly in quality qi. Therefore in what follows, I
proxy for firm size using qi.
70
2.3.1 Patents
Patent Distance and Firm Quality The radius of the circle C is normalized
to 1/pi such that the maximum distance between any two points along the circle is
equal to 1. Similar to firms, innovations (patents) in production are also located
along the circle. Figure 2.1b illustrates this in an example. Firms i and k are
located in different parts of the circle. There is a patent z that has a distance di to
firm i and dk to firm k.
Firm quality improves upon the invention or acquisition of new, patented in-
novations. Consider an innovating firm i. Its quality improves according to the
following law of motion
qnewi = qi + γxi
where γ is some scale parameter and xi ∈ [0, 1] is the goodness of fit of the patent to
the firm. Similarly, I can define patent distance di ∈ [0, 1] as the inverse of goodness
of fit:
di = 1− xi.
Low values of di indicate that a patent is a good fit to firm i. Given the linearity
of the profit function in (2.3.2), the incremental gain to monopolist i from licensing
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this patent is
∆Πi = pi [qi + γ (1− di)]− piqi
= piγ (1− di) .
(2.3.3)
Given that pi and γ will appear multiplicative for the rest of the analysis, I normalize
γ = 1 such that
∆Πi = pi (1− di) . (2.3.4)
2.3.2 Non-practicing Entities
There are NPEs in this economy that may act as (i) middle men or as (ii) stick-up
artists. They have two key features: First, they have a broad network of firms
to whom they may license patents as middle men. Second, they have substantial
financial and legal resources that increases their likelihood of winning a case in court
when they act as a stick-up artist. I detail these features now.
The Middle Man Any firm i that owns a patent can decide to keep its patent,
or sell it to NPEs. NPEs, through its wide network in the market, can potentially
find a user k that is a better fit for the patent with shorter distance dk < di. Having
access to a large network is the first advantage of the NPE over a single innovating
firm.
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The Stick-up Artist The second key ingredient of my model is that patents may
be infringed by other firms. Let me denote the firm that infringes on firm i’s patent
by j. When j infringes on i’s patent, firm i can go to court and sue j. Firm i wins
the lawsuit with probability βi. Winning a court case depends on resources that a
firm has to fight in the court. As a result, I assume that probability of winning the
court case is a function increasing in firm size such that:19
βi = β(qi) and β′(qi) > 0.
The second strength of NPEs is that it has greater experience and resources to
fight in the court, i.e., it has a high βnpe. Therefore, when a firm does not have
enough resources and faces a risk of infringement, it might be desirable for the firm
to sell the patent to an NPE.
I describe the rest of the dynamics of the model with the help of the following
game tree:
19My analysis relies on the fact that an NPE and a patent producer have differential bargaining
and/or negotiating power on the market. To keep the math tractable, I assume symmetric bar-
gaining power throughout yet differential negotiating power across firms and NPEs. Alternatively,
one can model the bargaining power (instead of the winning probability) as a function of the firm
size. The results would go through the same way, yet the expressions would be less tractable.
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Figure 2.2: Game Tree
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In the beginning of the game, firm i produces a patent with a random distance
di. In addition, firm i realizes an idiosyncratic cost of finding an NPE, . Next it
decides to sell it to NPEs or keep it within the firm.
If it decides to keep the patent, then the game evolves according to the upper
branch.20 Before production takes place, the patent is infringed with probability
α. If there is no infringement with probability (1− α) , then the firm produces and
collects the end-of-period return V prodi which is simply equal to the marginal profit
20Since my focus on this chapter is the role of an NPE, I do not model the possibility of a patent
owner selling her patent to the end user. This structure is imposed without apology since patents
are sold mainly through intermediaries due to their larger networks, as described in Akcigit et al.
[2015].
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(the additional profit that the firm makes by using its new patent)
V prodi = pi (1− di) .
If there is an infringement, which happens with probability α, then i tries to settle
with j. If they cannot settle, i goes to court and wins with probability βi. When i
wins the case, it gets compensated for lost profits pi (1− di). Hence the expected
value of going to court is:
V courti = βipi (1− di) . (2.3.5)
Let Ωj denote the profit that j is making by infringing i’s patent. When the court
decides in favor of i, then firm j also loses Ωj. Settlement generates a surplus that
the two parties split through Nash bargaining with equal bargaining power for both
sides. Let me denote the settlement (licensing) fee that i will collect from j by pi,j.
Then the fee is simply the solution to the following problem
pi,j = arg max
(
pi,j − V courti
)0.5 (
V courti + βiΩj − pi,j
)0.5
. (2.3.6)
Note that player i could receive V courti if there is no agreement and therefore her net
surplus from bargaining is pi,j − V courti . Likewise, player j will need to pay V courti
and also give up his Ωj additional profit if the case goes to court and the court
decides in favor of i with probability βi. Therefore j’s surplus from bargaining is
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V courti + βiΩj. This problem delivers the following settlement amount
pi,j = V courti +
βiΩj
2 ,
where V courti is expressed in (2.3.5). The settlement fee that j pays i is increasing
in i’s probability of winning the case βi, and in the profit that firm j is making by
infringing i’s patent. Now, going back one step in the game tree in Figure 2.2, I
can calculate the expected value to i of keeping the patent as
V keepi = αpi,j + (1− α)V prodi
= αβi
[
pi (1− di) + Ωj2
]
+ (1− α) pi (1− di) .
(2.3.7)
Now consider what happens if i decides to sell the patent to NPEs, as illustrated
by the lower branch. With probability α, there is a chance that j infringes the patent
that now belongs to NPEs. In this case, NPEs can go to court or settle with j.21
The main difference now, compared to (2.3.6), is that NPEs by definition does not
produce and therefore does not have pi (1− di) to ask. However, NPEs can block j
from gaining Ωj and has potentially a higher probability of winning βnpe. Therefore
the problem for the settlement can be written as
pnpe,j = arg max (pnpe,j)0.5 (βnpeΩj − pnpe,j)0.5
21Note that in equilibrium, no party goes to court. Yet the possibility of going to court generates
a threat that affects that bargaining through the outside option.
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which delivers the following settlement fee that NPEs will charge j:
pnpe,j =
βnpeΩj
2 .
If there is no infringement with probability (1− α), the NPE licenses the patent to
some firm k with a distance equal to dk and profit equal to Ωk. The price again is
determined through Nash bargaining as follows:
pnpe,k = arg max [pnpe,k]0.5 [Ωk (1− dk)− pnpe,k]0.5 .
The price is simply
pnpe,k =
Ωk (1− dk)
2 .
Now I can compute the expected value to NPEs of owning the patent:
Vnpe = αpnpe,j + (1− α) pnpe,k. (2.3.8)
Next, I turn to the bargaining problem between i and NPEs. After the realization
of the distance, firm i can sell the patent to NPEs through Nash bargaining. As
long as Vnpe > V keepi , this problem can be written as
pi,npe = arg max
(
pi,npe − V keepi
)0.5
(Vnpe − pi,npe)0.5 . (2.3.9)
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Hence the equilibrium price that firm i charges NPEs is,
pi,npe =
V keepi + Vnpe
2 , (2.3.10)
where V keepi is expressed in (2.3.7) and Vnpe in (2.3.8). I assume that there is a cost of
contracting with an NPE, , that comes from a uniform distribution as  ∼ U [0, κ].
There will be a sale between i and NPEs if and only if, there is a potential surplus
that is bigger than the cost, pi,npe−V keepi > . Therefore the probability of sale can
be written as
Pr (sale) =

0 if pi,npe − V keepi < 0,
1 if pi,npe − V keepi > κ,
pi,npe−V keepi
κ
otherwise.
(2.3.11)
2.3.3 Model Predictions
In this section, I generate a number of important comparative statics which I later
test using micro data.
First, I focus on the determinants of the probability of a patent sale to NPEs in
(2.3.11). My first result relates the probability of a sale to the size of the innovating
firm.
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Prediction 1 An NPE is more likely to buy patents from small firms:
∂
∂qi
Pr (sale) = −β
′(qi)α
2κ
[
pi (1− di) + Ωj2
]
< 0.
Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for litigation-prone patents:
∂2
∂α∂qi
Pr (sale) = −β
′(qi)
2κ
(
Ωj
2 + pi (1− di)
)
< 0.
This result follows from the fact that small firms have a harder time defending
themselves in court. Hence, NPEs purchase patents from small firms in order to
enforce their patent rights in the case of infringement. That is the reason why NPEs
purchase patents from small firms, especially more litigation-prone patents.
Next, I focus on the second role of NPEs, which is reallocating innovations to
reduce the distance to the owning firm.
Prediction 2 The likelihood of a patent sale increases with distance of the patent
from the initial innovating firm:
∂
∂di
Pr (sale) = αβipi + (1− α) pi2κ
> 0.
79
Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for large firms, i.e.,
∂2
∂di∂qi
Pr (sale) = β
′(qi)αpi
2κ
> 0.
The intuition for this result is that patents that are a poor fit with the inventing
firm will not be well-utilized. The inventing firm will therefore considers selling it
in the secondary market through NPEs. Note that a technologically close patent is
more valuable for a large firm than a small one. When distance increases it lowers
the value of a patent more for large firm. Hence, high patent distance is more costly
for large firms and increases the probability of a sale faster for large firms than for
small ones.
My model has important predictions on the sale price of a patent that was
expressed in (2.3.10). I now turn to these predictions.
Prediction 3 NPEs pay more for large firms’ patents:
∂pi,npe
∂qi
=
β′(qi)α
[
pi (1− di) + Ωj2
]
2
> 0.
The equilibrium price of a patent is determined through a bargaining that was
described in (2.3.9). The outside option of a patent is higher for large firms since
they can defend the patent better. Hence, large firms receive a higher price for their
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patents.
Next I focus on the link between sale price and patent distance.
Prediction 4 The acquisition price decreases with patent distance to the seller:
∂pi,npe
∂di
= − [αβi + 1− α] pi2
< 0
The intuition for this result is similar to its counterpart on the patent sale proba-
bility. Distant patents are less valuable to the original inventor, which lowers the
outside value of the patent. This reduces the price that is asked by the seller.
I now turn to the licensing side.
Prediction 5 The average price that a licensing firm pays to NPEs is decreasing
in the distance to the licensee
∂pnpe,k
∂dk
= −Ωk2
< 0,
The inutition here is straightforward: More distant patents are worth less to
liecensees, so they have a lower willingness to pay.
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2.3.4 Downstream Entry into the Market
How does the existence of an NPE affect incentives to innovate? In this section, I
consider the endogenous innovation decision of a downstream firm j. My analysis
proceeds in two steps. First, I consider a market without an NPE and then I
examine the change in innovation rates when an NPE enters the market.
The Case without an NPE In the above model, parameter α captured the
probability that a downstream firm j infringes firm i’s patent. In reality, this can
happen because (i) the downstream firm is a non-innovator and simply produces
a "me-too" product with probability φ, or (ii) because the downstream firm made
an attempt to innovate a brand-new product with endogenous probability µj but
fell short of being sufficiently non-obvious and ended up infringing i’s patent with
probability τ . Therefore α has two components:
α = φ︸︷︷︸
non−innovator
+ τµj︸︷︷︸
innovator
where φ captures the probability that a non-innovating and τµj an innovating down-
stream j infringes i.22
I focus now on the endogenous innovation decision µj. Recall that the incre-
mental profit of firm j from adding a new technology to its portfolio is simply Ωj.
Products produced with this new technology may infringe an existing patent with
22In Section 2.6, I will make the necessary assumptions to ensure that α ∈ [0, 1].
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probability τ , and when there is no NPE in the market, there will be a side set-
tlement between firm i and j at price pi,j. There is a convex cost to innovation
c(µj) =
µξj
ηξ
where ξ > 1 governs the convexity of the cost function. Therefore the
innovation decision is simply
max
µj
µj [τ(Ωj − pi,j) + (1− τ)Ωj]− µ
ξ
j
ηξ
 .
This implies that when there is no threat of an NPE, the equilibrium innovation
decision is
µno−npej = [η(Ωj − τpi,j)]
1
ξ−1 .
The Case with an Active NPE Consider now the case of an NPE in the
market. This time, inventor i has the option of using NPEs in the market. Since I
have already shown that pnpe,j ≥ pi,j, this increases the expected price 23
E(p.,j) ≡ Pr(i uses NPE)× pnpe,j + [1− Pr(i uses NPE)]× pi,j
paid by j in the case of a conflict. Therefore the maximization problem becomes
max
µnpej
µnpej [τ(Ωj − E(p.,j)) + (1− τ)Ωj]−
(
µnpej
)ξ
ηξ
 .
23Even though pnpe,j ≥ pi,j , i will not always sell to an NPE even when one is in the market
because of the cost  of contracting with NPEs.
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In equilibrium, the innovation rate is simply
µnpej = [η(Ωj − τE(p.,j))]
1
ξ−1 .
Now I can focus on the change in the innovation rate ∆µj ≡ µnpej − µno−npej with
and without an NPE in the market. The change in innovation rate is simply
∆µj = η
1
ξ−1 [[Ωj − τE(p.,j)]
1
ξ−1 − [Ωj − τpi,j]
1
ξ−1 ]
< 0.
since pnpe,j > pi,j. Note also that this effect is more pronounced for more valuable
innovations.
Prediction 6 The introduction of NPEs reduces downstream innovation, µj.
2.3.5 Final Remarks on the Theory
In the above model, I focused on various predictions of impacts on patent sales and
pricing. An additional question of interest is, how does patent litigation risk affect
patent sale probability and price? Through the lens of my model, litigation risk
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affects the likelihood of a sale as follows:
∂ Pr (sale)
∂α
=
 [βnpe − βi] Ωj2 + [1− βi] pi (1− di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stick−up Artist
− Ωk (1− dk)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Middle Man
 /2κ
≶ 0.
Note that the impact of litigation has both positive and negative impact on the
likelihood of a sale. The sign depends on the specific role of NPEs. If the dominant
role of NPEs is to defend a firm’s patent rights in the court, then increased litigation
risk increases the likelihood of a sale. However, if the dominant role of an NPE
is to allocate innovations more efficiently in the market (through lower dk), then
higher litigation risk has a negative impact on sales. This is because the higher
litigation risk mitigates the ability of NPEs to allocate innovations to a better user
for production. The net effect depends on the exact magnitudes of these two forces,
therefore the link between litigation risk and patent sale is ambiguous.
Likewise, the link between litigation risk and the expected licensing fee that
NPEs would charge or the price that NPEs pays to purchase the patent depends on
the magnitude of the two roles of NPEs. For instance the expected licensing fee is
E(pnpe,.) = αpnpe,j + (1− α)pnpe,k. Then the impact of the increased litigation risk
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on licensing fee is
∂E(pnpe,.)
∂α
= [βnpeΩj − (1− dk)Ωk] /2
≶ 0.
The impact of litigation risk on the purchase price is
∂pi,npe
∂α
= [βi + βnpe] Ωj − 2 [1− βi] pi (1− di)− Ωk (1− dk)4 .
≶ 0.
As these expressions indicate, my model predicts that the direct impact of litigation
risk on patent sale and price is ambiguous and depends on the exact magnitudes of
the two roles of NPEs.
Active NPE and the Overall Innovation Ultimately, the paramount policy
question is how do NPEs impact overall innovation in the market? To answer this
question, I first look at the innovation incentives of upstream firms.
The existence of an NPE in a market increases the outside option for the original
producer of the patent. Hence, if I denote the change in innovation effort of firm i
as ∆µi ≡ µnpei − µno−npei , then I can show that
∆µi = η [E[pi,npe − ]]
1
ξ−1 − η [E[Vkeep]]
1
ξ−1
≥ 0.
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Hence, the existence an NPE in the market provides additional innovation incentive
to the upstream firm i. Consider now both i and j’s innovation, with and without
NPEs. I note that i’s innovation rate increases when NPEs shows up while j’s
downstream innovation decreases. The change innovation rate to adding NPEs is
∆µ ≡ (µnpej − µno−npej )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+ (µnpei − µno−npei )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
≶ 0.
I note here the ambiguous effect, which depends on the parameter values. I calibrate
the model and discuss further in Section 2.6 and the appendix.
Summary of Predictions I summarize the predictions of the model as follows:
1. NPEs are more likely to buy patents from small firms. Moreover, this likeli-
hood is more pronounced for litigation-prone patents.
2. The likelihood of a patent sale increases with distance to the initial innovating
firm. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for large firms.
3. NPEs pay more for large firms’ patents.
4. The acquisition price decreases with patent distance to the seller.
5. The average price that any licensing firm will pay to NPEs decreases with
distance to the licensee.
6. The introduction of NPEs reduces downstream innovation.
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2.4 Data and Variables
This research is made possible by the use of confidential data obtained from a col-
lection of NPEs covering tens of thousands of patents. This includes several unique
measures of NPEs: individual patent-level licensing revenue, licensing agreements,
characteristics of assignees that sell to NPEs, and characteristics of firms that li-
cense from NPEs. A data use agreement places some mild restrictions on what I
may disclose about the data, including the source, exact number of patents, and
non-normalized revenue figures. However, there are no restrictions on the types
of analyses I may perform, nor pre-approval for any findings. Since there are a
number of different data sources and a large amount of derived variables, I provide
substantial further detail in the appendices.
2.4.1 Data Sources
I use the following data sources for this project: United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office Patent Application Bibliographic Data (PAB), NPE Data (ND), Lex-
Machina (LM), U.S. Patent Citation Data (USCIT), The Careers and Co-Authorship
Networks of U.S. Patent Inventors (INV). The first source contains basic front page
data for patents and patent fixed characteristics. The second source helps us to
retrieve yearly licensing costs for each patent, the name of the licensee, the amount
of money paid to obtain the patents from originating entities, the date of licensing
for each transaction and the date of acquisition for each patent. The third source is
88
used to retrieve information on litigated patents. The fourth source is used to con-
struct certain variables related to citations for patents recorded in the first source.
The fifth source is used to retrieve information about individually owned patents.
Further detail on the data follows.
Patent Application Bibliographic Data (PAB) This database contains basic
‘front page’ data for patents issued from 1963 to 2014. It comes from a custom
extract DVD generated by Electronic Information Products Division of USPTO.
The following variables are used from this database:
• Patent number: The unique patent number is assigned to each patent
granted by USPTO.
• Application date: Date of application for each patent.
• Grant date: Date of grant for each patent.
• Assignee number: The assignee number assigned to each patent granted by
USPTO. Where the assignee is an individual this field is blank, so I merge the
data with INV using unique patent numbers to obtain the inventor/assignee.
Since PAB identifiers do not account for subsidiaries, mergers or acquisitions,
Part B describes an algorithm to minimize problems this may cause.
• Patent technology class: The technology class assigned to the patent by
USPTO according to its internal classification system as of 12/31/2014.
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NPE Data (ND) This confidential data contains information on acquisition
deals, licensing deals, and patent characteristics. The acquisition deal data includes
the unique identifier for acquired portfolio, patent acquisition date and amount paid.
The licensing data includes the licensee name, licensing date, primacy of patent in
the deal. The patent characteristics include citations, claims, expiration date, and
technology category.
Lex Machina (LM) From the Lex Machina database I use number of times that
a patent is asserted in court, number of infringements found in each case, findings of
invalidity, total damages awarded, and case beginning and end dates. The database
includes only USPTO granted patents and covers cases filed after 1999.
U.S. Patent Citation Data (USCIT) U.S. Patent Citation Data includes U.S.
patent citations for utility patents issued from 1975-2014. Each observation is a
citing-cited pair. The database is based on information from a custom extract
DVD generated by the Electronic Information Products Division of the USPTO.
Non-utility patents were eliminated from the cited patent list. Citing patents
include all types of patents. In addition, cited U.S. patent applications were removed
from the file. These patents were removed as citations to sources other than U.S.
utility patents are reported haphazardly. 24
24I complement the citation data with the citation data located at
http://www.patentsview.org/web/. The main reason is to identify the citing entity charac-
teristics for the event study.
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The Careers and Co-Authorship Networks of U.S. Patent Inventors (INV)
Extensive information on the inventors of patents granted in the United States is
obtained from Lai et al. [2009]’s updated dataset. These authors use inventor names
and addresses as well as patent characteristics to generate unique inventor identi-
fiers. This data set is mainly used to retrieve assignee identifiers for individually
owned patents as the PAB does not specify any assignee number for individually
owned patents.
2.4.2 Variables and Summary Statistics
In order to compare patents of different ages, both forward citations and revenue
are estimated for the entire lifetime of the patent. I calculate lifetime citations by
inflating the total citations already received by the ratio of the total mean citations
of the same technology class divided by the mean for the average patent of the same
age and technology class. I employ an analogous approach for the lifetime revenue
calculation, based on current realized revenue, with the addition that revenues are
normalized so that the annual mean is 10. Further detail on the normalization
procedures may be found in Appendix B.1.
Table 2.1 reports patent-level summary statistics both for NPE-acquired patents
and the comparable universe of patents applied for from the USPTO during the
same years, 1987 - 2014. “Comparable universe” means the data in the second
panel is weighted so that the distribution of IPC3 technology classes is the same
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for NPE and Comparable USPTO Patents
Panel 1: NPE Patents Panel 2: PTO Patents
Variables Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd
Distance to Originating Entity 33.0 27.5 27.4 29.7 26.7 22.4
Originating Patent Portfolio Size 2380 140 5180 8710 1860 15010
Log Originating Pat. Portfolio Size 5.01 4.97 2.82 6.96 7.53 2.82
Litigation Risk 11.7 10.3 8.63 8.79 7.72 7.27
Individual Inventor 0.06 0 0.23 0.01 0 0.10
Small Originating Entity 0.31 0 0.46 0.15 0 0.36
Medium Originating Entity 0.49 0 0.50 0.46 0 0.50
Large Originating Entity 0.15 0 0.35 0.38 0 0.49
Total Claims 19.2 17.0 14.9 18.5 17.0 1300
Lifetime Forward Citations 31.1 11.3 60.0 18.1 5.4 41.2
Backward Citations 22.7 8.0 52.6 14.5 6.0 38.2
Hotness 31.4 25.0 29.8 26.5 16.7 29.5
Age 13.6 14.0 5.2 10.8 10.0 6.0
Age at Acquisition 8.2 8.0 5.2 n/a n/a n/a
Lifetime Revenue 200 37.5 1950 n/a n/a n/a
Sale Indicator 100 100 0 13.6 0 116
Notes: Panel 1: Patent-level data from 1987 - 2014 includes all patents in NPE dataset. Panel
2: Patent-level data from 1987 - 2014 includes all patents granted by USPTO in IPC3 categories
with at least one patent in NPEs data. USPTO data is weighted by NPE patent distribution
across IPC3 classes. Individual Inventor is one if there is a single listed inventor and no assignee.
Please see text and appendix for variable definitions.
as for NPEs data in the first panel.25 The table introduces various variables that I
use extensively to help understand what impacts the decision to sell to NPEs or to
license from them.
The first such variable is a patent distance metric, first introduced in Akcigit
et al. [2015] and described in more detail in Appendix B.1.1. The distance is
a function of the overlap in technology classes of the backward citations of two
patents. I calculate the average distance between a patent and the patent portfolio
25IPC3 refers to the 3-digit International Patent Classification code used to classify patents into
technology categories.
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of its originating firm as a measure of whether the patent is relatively central or
peripheral to the firm. The originating entity refers to the original assignee or
original inventor if the original assignee is missing. In both NPEs and PTO data,
the distribution of the metric is slightly right-skewed, with a mean of 32.95 for
NPE-held patents and 29.74 for all patents. Thus firms appear to be more likely to
sell distant patents to NPEs, as my model in the previous section predicts.
Litigation Risk is a measure of the likelihood that a patent will be litigated.
I adopt the model in Lanjouw and Schankerman [2001] with small modifications
to produce this index (see Appendix B.1.1 for greater detail). Mean litigation
risk is substantially higher for patents held by NPEs, which is consistent with the
prediction of my model.
The next variable is more straightforward: Originating entity size is the number
of patents (including subsequently granted applications) in the entity’s portfolio
at the time of the patent’s grant. The distribution for NPE-held patents is quite
right-skewed (Figure 2.3), and the typical patent sold to an NPE comes from a much
smaller patent portfolio than average. This is not surprising as I saw in Section 2.3
that smaller firms have more to gain from an NPEs larger network and bargaining
power, relative to large firms. I report several other measures of size: small, medium
and large originating entity as well as individual inventor.26 A comparison of means
for each of these measures reinforces the observation above: NPEs acquire patents
from smaller entities.
26The definitions for these variables may be found in Appendix B.1.1.
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Figure 2.3: Originating Entity Size Distribution
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Notes: Originating entity size is defined as the log patent portfolio size of the originating firm at
the time of NPE patent acquisition.
NPE-held patents include slightly more claims than average, but there is a
much larger disparity for forward and backward citations. The average patent sold
to an NPE has over 70 percent more lifetime forward citations and 57 percent more
backward citations than average. Since forward citations and backward citations
are among the most commonly-used proxies for patent value, and NPEs presumably
target high-value patents, these findings should not be surprising. NPE-held patents
also cite more recent patents, which is captured by the hotness variable. Hotness
is defined as the share of backward citations to patents that are at most three
years older than the patent itself. NPE-held patents have a 4.85 percentage point
higher average hotness than the universe. They are also several years older than
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the comparison group, with an average age of 13.64 years (as of 2014, measured
from application date) compared to 10.84 years for the universe and were acquired
by NPEs at 8.24 years. Finally, as discussed above, lifetime licensing revenue is
normalized to be 200.
In the appendix I report additional summary statistics. In particular, B.1.2
reports deal-level summary statistics on all deals through which the NPEs acquired
patents from 2003-2014 and B.1.2 reports patent-licensee level summary statistics.
2.5 Estimation and Results
My model has many implications that can be tested with the data. In this section,
I report the results from several different empirical analyses aimed at doing so.
2.5.1 Patent Sale (Predictions 1 and 2)
I first examine which factors relate to the likelihood of a patent sale using the
following specification:
Patent Salei,j,t = α + β ×Xi,j,t + φ×Mi,j,t + ψ × Zi,j,t + γj + ηt + i,j,t (2.5.1)
where Patent Salei,j,t is a dummy variable that is “1” if patent i in technology
category j, with application year t is sold to an NPE and “0” otherwise. Xi,j,t
is a vector consists of the main variables of interest: Log Entity Size, Distance
to innovating Entity, Litigation Risk and Individual Inventor Indicator. Mi,j,t is
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a vector containing interaction terms, which may be seen in Table 2.2. Zi,j,t are
control variables: Total Claims, Lifetime Forward Citations, Backward Citations,
Hotness Index, Patent Age, and PatentAge2. γj is a set of technology category
dummies, measured at three-digit IPC level. ηt is a set of application year dummies
(only in column 5) and i,j,t is the error term. Robust standard errors are clustered
at innovating entity level. The results are reported in Table 2.2.
This table tests predictions 1 and 2 of the model. Column 1 shows that the
probability of a patent sale to an NPE is decreasing in firm size and the effect
is statistically significant across all specifications. In the empirical application, I
multiply dependent variable with 1000 to scale the coefficients. In addition to
being statistically significant, the magnitude is economically important as well.27
Holding all other variables at the mean level, a one percent increase in log entity size
increases the probability of sale by 1.57 %. Moreover, the impact of litigation risk
is strongly positive, which implies that patents that are more likely to be litigated
are more likely to be sold to NPEs. The interaction term is negative, which implies
that litigation risk becomes more important factor among small firms for patent
sale. This finding confirms prediction 1.
Next, I introduce focus on the relationship between patent distance and prob-
ability of a patent sale. The estimated positive coefficient on the distance variable
indicates that patents that are more distant to the originating firm are more likely
27Small Entities were those at least 2 standard deviation below the mean size and individual
inventors. I use specification 4 for magnitude analysis.
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Table 2.2: Patent Sale Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Sale Sale Sale Sale Sale
Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator
Log Entity Size -1.57*** -1.65*** -1.65*** -1.65*** -1.64***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Distance 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log Entity Size x Distance 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Litigation Risk 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10** 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log Entity Size x Litigation Risk -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Individual Inventor 2.23** 2.00* 2.00* -1.44 1.96*
(1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.41) (1.07)
Total Claims -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lifetime Forward Citations 0.03** 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Backward Citations 0.04** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hotness 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Distance x Litigation Risk -0.001
(0.001)
Individual Inventor x Distance -0.001
(0.01)
Individual Inventor x Litigation Risk 0.44***
(0.16)
Age 1.28*** 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.32***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Age2 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 3.90** 2.40 2.40 2.41 7.87***
(1.94) (1.85) (1.85) (1.85) (1.24)
IPC-3 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Application Year Control No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Notes: Linear probability model with patent sale to NPE as binary dependent variable. Sample
contains all U.S. patents granted 1987 - 2014. Distance measure is calculated with respect to
innovating entity. Robust standard errors clustered by originating entity in parentheses. Please
see the text and appendix for variable definitions and normalization.
to be sold. The positive coefficient on interaction with the firm size indicates that
distance becomes more pronounced as a reason for sale for large firms, which con-
firms prediction 2. Note that a standard deviation increase in distance (22.35)
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increases the probability of sale by 13 % (= (0.08 × 22.35)/13.64) while one stan-
dard deviation increase in litigation risk (7.27) increases sale probability by 5%
(= (7.27 × 0.10)/13.64). Litigation risk is more important for small entities and
individual inventors. A standard deviation increase in litigation risk increases sale
probability by 24 % for small entities
2.5.2 Acquisition Price (Predictions 3 and 4)
I perform a second set of regressions designed to test the implications of my theory
regarding patent acquisition prices. I estimate the OLS model specified below using
NPE deal-level data from 2003-2014.
LogAcquisitionPricei,t = α + β ×Ki,t + φ×Mi,t + ψ × Ji,t + ηt + i,t (2.5.2)
where LogAcquisitionPricei,t is the log normalized acquisition price for deal i in
year t. Ki,t is a vector consisting of the main variables of interest, Distance and Log
Entity Size. Mi,t is a vector consisting of interaction variables that may be found
in Table 2.3. Ji,t is a vector consisting of control variables: Total Claims, Lifetime
Forward Citations, Backward Citations, Hotness, Deal Size, Age, Age2. ηt is a set
of year dummies (included in column 5) and i,t is the error term. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the deal level. The results are reported in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 documents that NPEs pay more to larger firms which confirms predic-
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Table 2.3: The Determinants of Patent Acquisition Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Log Price Log Price Log Price Log Price Log Price
Log Entity Size 123.11*** 145.33*** 145.41*** 144.96*** 134.59***
(13.85) (15.18) (15.17) (15.16) (14.79)
Distance -11.41*** -13.48*** -13.49*** -13.01*** -12.64***
(1.13) (1.24) (1.23) (1.36) (1.24)
Log Entity Size x Distance -2.02*** -2.01*** -2.27*** -1.73***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.51) (0.44)
Litigation Risk -3.59 -8.93 -9.01 -6.64 -4.34
(7.33) (7.45) (7.54) (8.35) (7.69)
Log Entity Size x Litigation Risk -4.30*** -4.34** -5.51*** -3.89**
(1.64) (1.69) (2.02) (1.69)
Individual Inventor -117.75 -120.68 -120.30 87.34 -121.12*
(83.98) (83.27) (83.36) (162.52) (83.44)
Total Claims 8.55*** 9.20*** 9.22*** 8.98*** 10.11***
(2.78) (2.77) (2.77) (2.79) (2.77)
Lifetime Forward Citations 1.57 1.55 1.56 1.52 0.97
(1.00) (1.00) (1.02) (1.00) (1.04)
Backward Citations 7.80*** 7.61*** 7.61*** 7.60*** 7.93***
(1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04)
Hotness -0.45 -0.78 -0.78 -0.75 0.25
(1.46) (1.45) (1.46) (1.46) (1.36)
Deal Size 8.23*** 7.85*** 7.85*** 7.83*** 7.97***
(1.96) (1.86) (1.86) (1.86) (1.76)
Distance x Litigation Risk -0.01 -0.00
(0.11) (0.12)
Individual Inventor x Distance -2.64
(2.66)
Individual Inventor x Litigation Risk -9.79
(9.33)
Age 62.03*** 54.61*** 54.93*** 50.76***
(18.93) (18.88) (18.91) (19.26)
Age2 -4.99*** -4.68*** -4.70*** -4.46***
(1.23) (1.22) (1.22) (1.23)
IPC-3 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Funding Year Control No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.310 0.324 0.324 0.325 0.336
Notes: OLS regressions with Log Price as dependent variable. Acquisition deal-level data includes
all NPE patent acquisition deals in U.S. Distance measure is calculated with respect to innovating
entity. Robust standard errors clustered by acquisition deals in parentheses. Please see the text
and appendix for variable definitions and normalization.
tion 3 of the model. In addition, it shows that when a patent is more distant to the
innovating firm, NPEs pay less to buy it, which verifies prediction 4. Magnitudes
are economically important as well. A 100% increase in licensee size increases the
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fee by 13%. While a standard deviation increase in distance (28.01) decreases it by
37% (28.01× 13.33)/1000). 28
2.5.3 Licensing Fee (Prediction 5)
I next examine the determinants of the licensing fee paid to NPEs:
Log Licensing Feei,j,t = α + θ × Ai,j,t + ρ×Bi,j,t + Γi + δt + i,j,t (2.5.3)
where Log Licensing Feei,j,t is log normalized licensing fee received for patent i,
from licensee j in year t. The main variables of interests are included in vector
Ai,j,t which consists of Distance to Licensee, Litigation Risk and interactions. Bi,j,t
is a vector includes entity-level and patent-level controls, which are Log Licensee
Size, Total Claims, Backward Citations, Hotness, Lifetime Forward Citation, Patent
Age, and PatentAge2. Γi is a set if IPC3 technology class dummies and δt are year
dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered at licensee level and results are
reported in Table 2.4.
I find that the more distant a patent from the licensee, the lower the fee is (Table
2.4). This is in line with prediction 5 of the model. I also see that the licensing fee
is increasing in litigation risk and firm size. 29
The magnitudes are economically important as well. A 100% increase the licens-
28I use specification 5 for this analysis.
29Note that the license fee is multiplied by 1000 for greater legibility of the regression tables.
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Table 2.4: The Determinants of Patent Licensing Fee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Log Log Log Log Log
Licensing Licensing Licensing Licensing Licensing
Fee Fee Fee Fee Fee
Log Licensee Size 318.83*** 317.07*** 317.00*** 316.68*** 318.66***
(75.75) (73.98) (73.96) (73.98) (76.43)
Distance to Licensee -5.72** -5.23** -5.24** -4.45** -4.62**
(2.74) (2.47) (2.48) (2.03) (2.27)
Log Licensee Size x Distance 0.92 0.92 1.05
(0.90) (0.90) (0.90)
Litigation Risk 5.77*** 5.38*** 5.05*** 9.28*** 9.39**
(1.54) (1.56) (1.72) (1.92) (2.07)
Log Licensee Size x Litigation Risk 0.60 0.58 0.63
(1.13) (1.11) (1.13)
Individual Inventor 27.26 27.78 28.08 43.84 42.29
(36.30) (36.35) (36.35) (37.98) (37.94)
Total Claims 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.83* 0.84*
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.49) (0.49)
Lifetime Forward Citations 0.76*** 0.76** 0.75*** 0.56** 0.58**
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27)
Backward Citations 1.89*** 1.88*** 1.88*** 1.93*** 1.93***
(0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44)
Hotness 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.19
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21)
Distance x Litigation Risk -0.05
(0.07)
Age 58.47*** 58.03*** 58.05*** 52.30*** 53.73***
(15.17) (15.17) (15.18) (15.46) (15.50)
Age2 -2.03*** -2.02*** -2.02*** -1.90*** -1.94***
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
IPC-3 Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Transaction Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.552 0.554 0.555 0.552 0.549
Notes: This table reports results of OLS regressions with Log Licensing Fee as dependent variable.
Patent-Licensee-Year level data includes all NPE licensing transactions. Distance measure is
calculated with respect to licensee. Robust standard errors clustered by licensee in parentheses.
Please see the text and appendix for variable definitions and normalization.
ing price by 31.7 % while a standard deviation increase in distance (29.73) decreases
it by 13.3 % (= (4.45 × 29.73)/1000). Litigation risk also plays an important role
quantitatively. A standard deviation increase in litigation risk (8.61) increases the
log licensing fee by 8 % (= (8.61× 9.28)/1343.19).30
30I use specification 4 for magnitude analysis
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2.5.4 Downstream Innovation (Prediction 6)
In order to understand the effect of NPE patent acquisitions on patent citations,
I want to build the counterfactual of patent citations to NPE-held patents, had
they not acquired by NPEs. There are two main challenges to identify this effect.
First, the patents acquired by NPEs may have a different citation arrival trajectory
than the full population of patents. To address this challenge, I construct control
a group of placebo acquired patents in a difference-in-differences research design.
Second, the acquisition behavior of NPEs may not be exogenous to citation arrival.
I show that estimated effects of NPE-acquisition are significant only after the year
of acquisition, which alleviates potential concerns.
As a first step in my research design, I pair NPE patents with the patents in
population by exactly matching on their application year and number of forward
citations prior to acquisition period and the technology category (IPC at three
digit level) via coarsened exact matching algorithm (CEM).31 These matched pairs
constitute the main sample for the event study.
In order to understand the dynamics of the effect, while probing the validity of
my design by testing whether there is any effect of NPE acquisition before the event
occurs, I use a panel data model. The dependent variable is Yi,t which denotes the
number of forward citations received by patent i at time t. I include full set of leads
and lags around NPE acquisition for real acquired patents (LRealit ). The dynamic
31The details regarding matching algorithm can be found at
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/cem-stata.pdf.
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effects are associated with lags are denoted as {βReal(k)}5k=−5. Second, I include
a two period event dummy after around NPE acquisition that is both common to
real and placebo acquired patents (after). The predicted effect is denoted by βAll.
Lastly, I add three distinct set of fixed effects: age fixed effects (ait), year fixed
effects (ηt) and patent fixed effects (αi).
I estimate the following specification with OLS:32
Yi,t =
5∑
k=−5
βrealk 1{LRealit =k}+β
All×After+
20∑
j=1
λj1{ageit=j}+
2014∑
m=1998
ηm1{t=m}+αi+i,t
(2.5.4)
I combine all NPE patents together with placebo patents and estimate the model
using specification 2.5.4. I plot {βReal(k)}5k=−5 in Figure 2.4a.
In order to alleviate concerns for selection effects, I set patents that are acquired
by NPEs but located at the bottom decile of the value distribution as additional
control group and add set of leads and lags around NPEs acquisition. I split NPEs
sample as top and bottom value decile and combine them with the placebo patents.
Then, I estimate the following model:
Yi,t =

5∑
k=−5
βreal,topk 1{LReal,topit =k} +
5∑
k=−5
βreal,bottomk 1{LReal,bottomit =k} + β
All × After+
20∑
j=1
λj1{ageit=j} +
2014∑
m=1998
ηm1{t=m} + αi + i,t

(2.5.5)
32Adding the fixed effects above generates a collinearity problem. I follow the literature and
drop first two age and year dummies. I also normalize the coefficient of the -1 period with 0 as in
line with the literature.
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I plot {βReal,top(k)}5k=−5,{βReal,bottom(k)}5k=−5 in Figure 2.4b.
Figure 2.4: Event Studies
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Notes: Figure (2.4a): This figure reports results from a regression of the annual forward citations
on event dummies relative to the year of acquisition of a patent by an NPE. The regression makes
use of a balanced panel of patent-level data (5 years before and after acquisition year) from 1998-
2014 for NPE-acquired patents, placebo patents and include controls for patent, age and year fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at NPE acquired patent level as error bars. Figure
(2.4b): This figure reports a similar analysis for NPE-acquired patents located at top and bottom
value decile, placebo patents and include controls for patent, age and year fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at NPE acquired patent level as error bars.
F test for Pretrends I can formally test the hypothesis that point estimates
are the same before NPE acquisition and after NPEs acquisition. I cannot reject the
hypothesis that the point estimates are all the same before NPEs acquisition, but I
can after NPEs acquisition. Briefly, Table 2.5 indicates that there is no pre-trending
but an effect after NPE acquisition.
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Hbeforeo : βreal−5 = βreal−4 = βreal−3 = βreal−2
Haftero : βreal5 = βreal4 = βreal3 = βreal2 = βreal1
Table 2.5: Testing For Dynamic Effects, P values from F-test
Panel A(βreal) Panel B(βreal,top)
For HBefore0 0.43 0.83
For HAfter0 0.00001 0.00001
Notes: This panel reports the p-values of F-tests for equality of the β Real k coefficients from
specification 2.5.4 and 2.5.5, before and after acquisition, as specified by the hypotheses HBefore0
and HAfter0 .
The magnitude of the effect is modest. The decline in citations after acquisi-
tion(at one significant digits) amounts to 2.6% (.05/1.9) for specification 2.5.4.(The
average differential decline in all NPE patents in comparison to placebo patents.)
Explaining why the effect appears gradually I find that the nature of
licensing business and the nature of innovation as a stochastic process explain why
the effect of NPE acquisition manifests itself gradually, as shown by the changes in
the slopes in Figure 2.4a, and 2.4b. My data shows that NPE acquisitions do not
directly translated into licensing deals right away. It takes time to find the right
licensing entity. Mean duration is around 4.09 years in the data. The longer the
duration, the more likely that more potential licensing entities are contacted. As
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more entities are contacted and license patents over time, the identity of the patents
are more likely to be revealed to the current and potential licensees. This may lead
entities to stay away from innovating over NPE-patents to prevent future contact
with them. The fact that high citation and high value patents receive less citation
after NPE acquisition over time is consistent with this explanation.
2.6 Calibration
I have now seen empirical results that have corroborated a number of predictions
of the model. In this section, I would like to see the numerical properties of my
model for a reasonable set of parameter values. For this purpose, I now calibrate
the structural model.
In order to ensure that probability of infringement remains between 0 and 1, I
consider the following form for τ = (1 − φ)λ. Hence, my model has the following
11 parameters to be calibrated:
Θ ≡ [η, κ,E[di],E[dk],Ω, pi, φ, λ, βi, βnpe, ξ]
I calibrate the parameters in two steps. For four of the parameters, I rely on
the existing literature and use the commonly accepted values (external calibration).
For the rest of the parameters, I pick seven informative empirical momentsME and
minimize the distance between model-simulated momentsM(Θ) and their empirical
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counterparts by searching over the parameter space Θ as follows,
min
Θ
7∑
i=1
(MEi −Mi(Θ))2.
In the next section, I describe the identification of each parameter.
2.6.1 Identification
The externally calibrated parameters (η,E[di],E[dk], ξ) are chosen as follows:
1. R&D Cost Parameter, η: This parameter is calculated as the ratio of R&D
expenditures to firm sales for all licensing and innovating entities( who sell
their patents to NPEs) who have a record in Compustat.
2. Expected Distance to Innovating Entities, E[di]: This parameter is the mean
distance of patents that are sold to NPEs. Note that distance is measured
as distance to innovating entity. It is calculated from NPE data, using the
universe of upstream firms.
3. Expected Distance to Licensing Entities, E[dk]: This parameter is the mean
distance of patents that are licensed from NPEs. Please note that distance
is measured as distance to licensing entity. It is assumed to take a uniform
distribution on the unit circle.
4. Convexity of Cost Function, ξ: The innovation production function has been
estimated to be a quadratic by a large literature as it is summarized in Akcigit
107
and Kerr [2017].
Next, I describe the moments that I use to identify the internally calibrated
parameters. The reader should note that all these moments are jointly targeted.
1. Price upstream producer sells to NPE: This is set to 1 and is noted in relation
to the price NPEs sell to downstream producer. From NPE acquisition cost
data.
2. Price NPE sells to downstream producer or outside producer This comes from
NPE revenue data and is solved in terms of its ratio to acquisition cost.
3. Correlation between distance of upstream to NPE and price Correlation be-
tween the distance of i and the price.
4. Correlation between price sold and bought from NPE Correlation between the
acquisition cost and the lifetime revenue.
5. Innovation intensity of upstream innovator This is taken as the percentage of
patents in NPE set that are cited by downstream innovators.
6. Probability of sale to NPE The probability of sale is taken as the average
probability of reassignment in the patent class (IPC4) where NPEs are most
active.
7. Proportion of infringement from non-innovators I set this benchmark value
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to 0.50 as the to denote the probability that an NPE will go after a non-
innovating producer if infringed.
Next, I describe the parameters.
1. Profit of Licensing Entity, Ω: This parameter is a proxy for the value of
patent to the potential licensee.
2. Profit of Innovating Entity, pi: This parameter is a proxy for the value of
patent to the inventing entity.
3. Probability of Winning in Court (Innovating Entity), βi: This parameter cap-
tures the strength of innovating entity in court. In particular, it captures the
probability that the innovating entity wins an infringement case.
4. Probability of Winning in Court (NPE), βnpe: This parameter captures the
strength of NPE in court. In particular, it captures the probability that NPE
wins an infringement case.
5. Max. Search cost, κ: i will pull a search cost ∼ U [0, κ] and κ is the maximum
value.
6.,7. Probability producer infringement and downstream Infringement Probability,
φ, τ : This determines the probability of whether an infringement comes from
a non-innovating producer or downstream innovator.
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2.6.2 Calibration Results
An important moment in my quantitative analysis is the proportion of infringement
coming from innovating versus non-innovating firms. Since I do not have a direct
moment to discipline this ratio, in the benchmark estimation, I will assume that
50% of the infringement is coming from non-inventors, i.e., φ/α = 0.5. Later in
my analysis, I will check the robustness of my results to alternative values, such as
φ/α ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.75, 1}. The estimated parameters together with the descriptions
are provided in Table 2.7 and the matched moments are described in Table 2.9.
Table 2.6: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Main Identification
— Panel A. External Calibration —
η R&D cost scaling 0.13 R&D/Sales
ξ Convexity of R&D cost 2 Akcigit and Kerr [2017]
E[di] Expected distance of upstream to NPE 0.30 NPE Distribution
E[dk] Expected distance of downstream to NPE 0.50 Taken in uniform[0,1]
— Panel B. Internal Calibration —
Ω Profit of Licensing Entity 4.03 Correlation of prices
pi Profit of Innovating Entity 0.17 Correlation between pi and di
φ Probability producer infringement 0.34 Pr producer infringement
τ Probability innovator infringement 0.66 Pr producer infringement
βi Probability of Winning (Upstream) 0.22 Correlations, Prices
βnpe Probability of Winning in Court (NPE) 0.96 Prices
κ Max. Search Cost 3.08 Pr(sale)
Notes: All parameters are estimated jointly.
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Table 2.7: Parameter Values,2
Parameter Description Value Main Identification
— Panel A. External Calibration —
η R&D cost scaling 0.13 R&D/Sales
ξ Convexity of R&D cost 2 Akcigit and Kerr [2017]
E[di] Expected distance of upstream to NPE 0.30 NPE Distribution
E[dk] Expected distance of downstream to NPE 0.50 Taken in uniform[0,1]
— Panel B. Internal Calibration —
Ω Profit of Licensing Entity 4.03 Correlation of prices
pi Profit of Innovating Entity 0.21 Correlation between pi and di
φ Probability producer infringement 0.33 Pr producer infringement
τ Probability innovator infringement 0.67 Pr producer infringement
βi Probability of Winning (Upstream) 0.26 Correlations, Prices
βnpe Probability of Winning in Court (NPE) 0.90 Prices
κ Max. Search Cost 2.62 Pr(sale)
Notes: All parameters are estimated jointly.
Table 2.8: Moments
Moment Data Model
Price upstream producer sells to NPE 1 0.99
Average Price NPE sells to downstream 1.63 1.65
Correlation between distance of upstream to NPE and price -0.07 -0.07
Correlation between price sold and bought from NPE 0.32 0.35
Innovation intensity of upstream innovator 0.47 0.46
Probability of sale to NPE 0.23 0.21
Proportion of infringement from non-innovators 0.50 0.53
Table 2.9: Moments,2
Moment Data Model
Price upstream producer sells to NPE 1 0.99
Average Price NPE sells to downstream 1.55 1.57
Correlation between distance of upstream to NPE and price -0.08 -0.10
Correlation between price sold and bought from NPE 0.38 0.41
Innovation intensity of upstream innovator 0.47 0.45
Probability of sale to NPE 0.23 0.21
Proportion of infringement from non-innovators 0.50 0.51
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2.7 Comparative statics
In this section, using the estimated parameter values, several quantitative experi-
ments are conducted to better understand the activity of NPEs in the market for
ideas.
My quantitative analysis tries to explore the conditions and the market structure
under which NPEs can increase or decrease the innovation rate. Briefly, I would
like to answer the following questions: First off, given the structural parameters
of the model, what would happen to overall innovation level if there is no NPE in
the market in comparison to the case when there is one? Second, what happens to
innovation as the legal strength of NPEs increases? My answers to the questions
above regarding the market micro structure help me to propose potential policies
which may have a concrete impact on how NPEs operate and affect the innovation.
However, as I know this will depend on the degree of infringement that comes
from producers versus innovators. Hence I will vary φ (probability of another pro-
ducer infringing) and put a vertical line in the places of the corresponding calibrated
values. As I see with the following exercises, the NPEs effect on innovation depends
on φ. I now look at changing values of φ on innovation level in Figure 2.5.
Before delving into any type of conclusion, I would like to clarify the term
middleman. As discussed in earlier sections, I ascribe two main roles to NPEs as
middleman. First, as I see the examples in other industries, the NPEs can be experts
at finding a better user for the patents. By transferring the assets where they can
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Figure 2.5: Innovation with and without NPE, with change in φ, calibrated values
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be used more productively, the NPEs can serve as a middleman. Second, the NPEs
can help small entities to enforce their property rights. In my analysis, I do not
automatically assume that all type of litigation or enforcement activity is harmful
to the economy. The innovation literature shows that the effect of enforcement can
go both ways. New entrants can benefit from enforcement as it increases the return
on their assets by discouraging potential infringers. On the other hand, incumbents
may stop innovating as the expected loss can be very large in case of infringement
even if the probability of infringement is very low. My approach here is to quantify
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Figure 2.6: Change in innovation with change in βnpe of i and j
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the effect of an NPE licensing on innovation. If the welfare cost of enforcement is
too large, then I would take it as an evidence for stick up artist theory.
Figure 2.5 shows that at the estimated parameter values I see a decline in the
aggregate rate of innovation. The decline amounts to 2.6%. Even though average
number is informative, decomposition of the effect shows that entrants benefit from
NPEs in comparison to the incumbents. More specifically, at the estimated param-
eter value, there is 8.4% increase in the innovation rate of new entrants while 11%
decline in the innovation rate of incumbents.
The welfare implications of my results boil down to the question of how soci-
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ety values innovation by entrants and incumbents. Those who put more value on
incumbent innovation may take the evidence as an indicator of Stick-Up Artist The-
ory while others may think the NPEs are middleman helping small inventors and
entrants. Another way to interpret the results is within the lens of innovation lit-
erature. The main question is who find better ideas? Incumbents or new entrants?
Young firms or old firms? Akcigit [2009] and Akcigit and Kerr [2017] suggest that
young firms are likely to find ground breaking ideas. In that sense, small increase
in new entrant innovation rate can bring about bigger changes even if it happens
at expense of incumbents.
In the following analysis, I would like to understand the effect of NPEs on
innovation for various values of enforcement capacity of new entrants. The analysis
is important in the sense that industries with higher rate of new entrants exhibit
different response to the NPEs in comparison to the industries dominated by the
incumbents. Thus, this analysis help me to understand whether one size fits all type
of policies are preferable in this setting. Results show that NPEs have comparative
advantage in enforcing property rights (βi < βnpe). The results are quantitatively
important as well. Figure 2.6 shows that any policy change which increases the
enforcement capacity of new entrants by 1 percent increases their innovation rate
by 0.15 percent holding all other estimated parameter values constant. On the
other hand, the same increase in the enforcement capacity of new entrants lead to
no change in innovation for incumbents.
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To sum up, my quantitative results show that NPEs can be taken as a middleman
or stick-up artists depending on how society values innovation by entrants and
incumbents.
2.8 Conclusion
What do non-practicing entities do and how do they impact innovation and tech-
nological progress? Despite the heated debates on this issue both in academic and
policy circles, the direct evidence on their business models is quite limited. In this
chapter, I attempt to answer these questions both theoretically and empirically. On
the theoretical side, the model gave new insights on how NPEs operate. Follow-
ing the common arguments, the model allowed for NPEs to purchase patents and
license them to other firms without using those patents for production. My model
highlighted two crucial roles for the NPEs: First, they could purchase patents that
are more litigation-prone and use them to threaten other firms to extract more li-
censing revenue. Even though this argument sounds negative, on the positive side
it creates value for the intellectual properties for the small firms who do not have
the sufficient means to defend their patents. While this give small firms incentives
to innovate more by restoring their patent values, the same action discourages large
firms who might be infringing on small firm patents. The second role of the NPEs
have been the middleman in the market for patents, which suffer deeply from in-
formational asymmetry. By having access to the full broker network around the
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country, NPEs can allocate patents to better users.
These elements in my model allowed me to come up with a number of important
testable implications. The second part of the chapter has utilized a first-hand data
from the NPEs. Very importantly, I could see how litigation risk and goodness of
fit of the patent affect patent sale decisions and pricing decisions. My empirical
analysis has shown that NPEs on average buy litigation-prone patents from small
firms and bad-fit patents from large firms. Both the distance and goodness of fit
reflect on the prices that the NPEs pay when they purchase and charge when they
license out.
I believe that these new facts that are shown in this chapter can shed light in
this important debate. Understanding the welfare consequences of the NPEs is one
of the most important policy issues that awaits further research.
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.0.1 Data Cleaning and Merging
Company Name Cleaning
In order to aggregate patents produced by or sold to the same entities properly, it is
critical to have a way to clean company names, which I discuss here. My approach
is similar to that used in the NBER Patent Database Project(PDP), but I extend
past the 2006 end date of that data set.33
Company identifiers used by the USPTO are known to contain serious flaws.
The most recent efforts to harmonize the company names do not take many issues
into account. In particular, the same firms are assigned to different identifiers
because of a change in their legal status (e.g. “MOSANTO TECHNOLOGY LLC”,
“MOSANTO TECHNOLOGY LLP”).
In order to tackle the flaws generated by USPTO identifiers, a conservative
company name cleaning algorithm is employed, so that assignee identifier flaws are
33I would like to thank Murat Alp Celik for sharing his cleaning algorithm.
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minimized. The main idea behind the cleaning algorithm is to clean all unneces-
sary company indicators, and company type abbreviations. If the resulting string
variables are the same, the algorithm assigns the same assignee identifier to each
modified string. The same algorithm is used to clean licensee names in ND.
The algorithm can be summarized as follows:
1.All letters of the string are made upper case.
2.Any part of the string coming after a first comma is deleted.
3.All non-alphanumeric characters are deleted.
4.The first 3 characters of the string are deleted if it starts with “THE”.
5.The company indicators such as CO, CORP, LLC, etc are removed.
6. If the resulting string has zero length, the original string is used. (e.g.
“ABCO, INC” , “COCO,INC”)
Data Merging
The PAB, LM, INV, ND datasets are merged on patent number. 34 I keep only
utility patents and drop those with application dates before 1987.35 I keep patents
assigned to individuals if the number of listed inventors is one. This is due to
the difficulty in calculating portfolios for ever-changing assignee groups of multiple
inventors. Thus, small, unincorporated groups are omitted from the analysis.
34 I complement the data with recently announced citation and claim decomposition data. It
can be found in the following link: http://www.patentsview.org/download.
35 More than 99 percent of the NPE patents were applied for after 1987. This is the main reason
that I focus on post-1987 patents.
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I keep only patents in technology categories (three-digit IPC) where the NPEs
operate. I merge USPTO classes and IPC classes and use IPC classes in my anal-
ysis.36 Each patent in PAB is matched with harmonized assignee identifiers. The
company name cleaning algorithm is used on assignee and licensee names from the
ND data. I match licensees with PAB data and keep those for which there is patent
data. I drop patents with missing distance to originating entity and litigation risk
from the acquisition deals.
A.0.2 Variable Construction
Exposure The first measure is exposure measure, which purports to identify the
sectors and firms that are more likely to be affected by the policy change. The
measure is widely used in literature.37
exposurej =
∑
i kiσi
N
(A.0.1)
The construction of the measure can be summarized in two steps. First, I calculate
litigation intensity measure, σ, for each four-digit IPC(International Patent Classifi-
cation) technology categories. Litigation intensity is the fraction of litigated patents
at four-digit IPC level before Supreme Court Decision(2003-2006). The exposure
index is constructed both at the firm level and industry level. Exposure measure
36See http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification for further information.
37Please check Mezzanotti [2016].
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at the industry level is identical to litigation intensity.
Constructing firm-level exposure variable requires a little more effort. Using the
patent portfolio information of each inventing entity, and 4-digit IPC classification
of the patents, I constructed a weighted average of litigation intensity for each
portfolio. The resulting measure is exposure at the firm level. Equation A.0.1
illustrates the measure at the entity level, where j denotes the entity, i denotes the
technology category of the patents in firm j portfolio, ki denotes the number of
entity j patents in technology category i, and N is the portfolio size of the inventing
entity.
The main reasoning behind my measure is as follows: Entities operating in high
litigation intensity sectors are more likely to be affected by the policy change.
A.0.3 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Deal Level Descriptive Statistics
stats Mean p50 sd
Log Acquisition Fee 4.33 4.15 1.30
Deal Quality 46.80 21.52 73.40
Exposure 0.37 0.046 2.97
Deal Size 10.38 3 26.87
Age 7.53 7.30 3.55
Backward Citations 18.54 11 26.93
Entity Size 21.30 2 64.99
Funding Year 2007.19 2008 1.45
Notes: NPE patent-level data from 2003 - 2009. Please see the appendix for variable definitions.
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A.0.4 Simplified Version of the Model
This section illustrates the model using simplified version of the main model.
Licensing Negotiations (β1) Consider a one-period enforcement game between
licensee(l) and intermediaries with the following parameters: r = 100, Cp = 20,
β1 = −0.5, PI = 0.1, ρ = 0.1, β2 = 0, β3 = 0 and the choice specific errors. An in-
crease in β1 from −0.3 to −0.2 makes the settlement more attractive option for the
licensee. Intermediaries reoptimize the settlement offers. The optimization leads to
an increase in the settlement offer from 19 to 30 and a decrease in the probability
that the offer being taken from 0.90 to 0.88. The intuition is very simple. An
increase in β1 means that the licensee is willing to pay more for settlement over
going to the court. Intermediaries prices the licensee preference for the settlement
by considering the trade-off between the increase in settlement offer and the re-
duction in choice probability. The different levels of β1 exhibit different patterns
in response to an increase in enforcement costs. In response to an increase in the
costs of enforcement, everything else equal, intermediaries decrease settlement offer.
Licensees with lower β1 are more likely to take the offer relative to the ones with
high β1. Figure A.1 shows a clear picture for various parameter values.
(PN) Consider a one-period version of the enforcement game between the licensee
and intermediaries with the following parameters: r = 100, Cp = 20, β1=-0.5,
PI = 0.1, ρ = 0.1, β2 = 0, β3 = 0 and the choice specific errors. An increase
in PN from 0.1 to 0.2 leads to an increase in the expected cost of resolving the
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Figure A.1: Acceptance Probability, Settlement Offers and β1
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case at the court from -28.1 to -36.2.38 As the option to go to the court is more
expensive than not going to the court, intermediaries can re-optimize by increasing
the settlement offer from 11.5 to 27. The licensee’s utility of settling the case outside
the court decreases from -5.75 to -13.5 respectively. The corresponding increase in
the choice probabilities (from 0.91 to 0.94) shows that the settlement offer is more
likely to get accepted after the increase in PN . An increase in PN leads to increase
both in the settlement offer and the probability of reaching a deal. The different
levels of PN exhibit different patterns in response to an increase in enforcement
costs. In response to an increase in the costs of enforcement, everything else equal,
intermediaries slightly decrease the settlement offer. The licensee with lower PN
gains a lot more regarding the increase in choice probability (offer being taken)
conditional on the decrease in settlement offers. Figure A.2 illustrates it for various
parameter values.
Heterogeneity & Dynamics Two primary heterogeneities generate interest-
ing cross-sectional variation and dynamics in the model. The first is the intrinsic
value (r). Consider two patents with (r1, r2) with (r1 > r2). As the option to
go to court is more expensive with the high intrinsic value r1, intermediaries can
re-optimize by increasing the settlement offer and taking its effect on the choice
probability into account. The higher the intrinsic value, the higher the settlement
offer and the probability of offer being taken by the licensee. Differences in intrinsic
values among different patents generate a reasonable cross-sectional variation in the
38Using the formula (PN × r × (1− PI)× (1− ρ)− Cp).
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Figure A.2: Acceptance Probability, Settlement Offers and PN
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Figure A.3: Patent Value, Product Revenue
settlement offers and probabilities. The evolution of the intrinsic value (r) over time
is also an important heterogeneity rationalizing the intermediaries’ optimal choice
of enforcement across periods. The movement of r over time mainly comes from the
trade-off between the depreciation of knowledge versus finding new ways to utilize
the same idea. The Markov distribution specified in the previous section captures
it. The second source of heterogeneity is the product market revenues of the li-
censees. The following example clarifies the role of the product market revenues in
generating dynamics in the model.
Example Consider a two-period version of the enforcement game with the fol-
lowing parameters in each period Cp = 20, Cd = 0, β1 = −0.5, PI = 0.1, ρ = 0.1,
β2 = 0.1, β3 = 0, r = 100, β = 1. I assume that β2 > 0. The assumption implies
that the firms with higher revenue have a preference towards settlement. Assume
further that licensee makes no revenue in product markets in the first period and
makes 100 in the second period. The optimal settlement offer for each period is 73
and 93 with choice probabilities 0.96 and 0.97. The expected intermediary-profit
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from enforcement is 71 and 91 respectively. The optimal strategy for intermediaries
is to wait in the first period and enforce the patent in the second period. The
simple example underlines the crucial fact that product market revenues can have
an impact on the dynamics of the enforcement decision.
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B Appendix: Chapter 2
B.1 Data and Variable Descriptions
B.1.1 Variable Construction
Lifetime Citations
I construct a lifetime forward citation variable for each patent to account for the
fact that patents are different ages, and therefore have differing amounts of time to
accumulate citation.
In order to construct this measure, the mean forward citations-patent age rela-
tionship is constructed for each technological category. I calculate lifetime citations
by inflating the total citations already received by the ratio of the total mean cita-
tions of the same technology class divided by the mean for the average patent of the
same age and technology class. While this procedure will understate the number of
lifetime citations for any patent that has zero in the data set, the mean number of
lifetime cites should still be correct.
The procedure is applied to all patents granted after 1976 using technology
categories in Hall et al. [2001]. Note that in the final analysis I limit my attention
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to patents with application year after 1987.
Acquisition Price
The patents are purchased in bundles of firms at a given cost. I deflate this cost
to real 2010 dollars. For deal-level analysis, e.g. 2.3, some patent bundles combine
patents that are not part of the analysis with those that are (e.g. I do not use
international patents). In this case, I adjust the acquisition cost by the revenue
weights at the broadest level–i.e. whether the patent is in my sample or not. For
instance, if a patent outside my sample on average is worth 20% of a patent in the
sample, I assign in the deal 5/6 of the cost to the patent in the sample for every
1/6 assigned to international patent.
Lifetime Revenue
As with citations, it is necessary to calculate a single revenue number so that I may
compare patents of different ages. I begin with per-patent annual nominal revenue
numbers and use the CPI to deflate them to real 2010 dollars. For each technol-
ogy category, a mean revenue-patent age relationship is constructed. The lifetime
revenue of a patent is estimated by inflating the observed cumulative revenue by
the ratio of the mean lifetime revenue to the mean cumulative revenue for patents
of the same age (by technology category). I then normalize all revenue amounts so
that mean annual revenue is 10 in order to maintain the confidentiality.
Occasionally patents generate licensing revenue after expiration (since they may
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still generate income from prior infringement). In this case no normalization pro-
cedure is used and the observed real revenue is simply summed. Since patents may
also generate revenue prior to grant (in anticipation of grant) I begin observing
revenue at the first filing date (which is the same as application date for 90 per-
cent of patents). That is, patent age is defined as the difference between revenue
generation year and first filing year. Revenue realized while a patents is classified
as abandoned, acquired as inactive, lapsed, filed, or inactive is simply added to the
normalized real revenue.
Distance
In order to quantify the distance between two technology classes, I define distance
as in Akcigit et al. [2015], using the first 2 digit IPC to denote a technology class:
d(X, Y ) ≡ 1− #(X
⋂
Y )
#(X⋃Y ) , with 0 ≤ d(X, Y ) ≤ 1.
where #(X ⋂Y ) denotes the number of patents that cite technology classes X
and Y together, and #(X ⋃Y) denotes the number of patents which either cite X
or Y or both.
Also following Akcigit et al. [2015], I construct a patent-to-entity distance met-
ric. The distance of a patent p to an entity f’s patent portfolio is calculated by
calculating the average distance of p to each patent in entity f’s patent portfolio as
follows.
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dι(p, f) ≡
 1
||Pf ||
∑
p′∈Pf
d(Xp, Yp′)ι
 1ι
where 0 < ι < 1, and where 0 ≤ dι(p, f) ≤ 1. Note that Pf represents the
set of all patents that were invented by entity f prior to patent p, ||Pf || denotes
the cardinality of the set, and d(Xp, Yp′) measures the distance between technology
classes of patents p and p′.
My baseline results use ι = 23 . Using the measure above, I constructed two
different distance measures. Distance to originating entity and distance to licensee.
The resulting measure is multiplied by 100 to increase the readability.
Litigation Risk
In order to estimate the likelihood a patent may be involved in litigation I make
use of the linear probability model model developed in Lanjouw and Schankerman
[2001]:
ILitigatedi,j,t = ζ + ηi + δt + φ× COi,j,t + i,j,t (B.1.1)
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is 1 if the patent is
ever litigated or a complaint filed and 0 otherwise and (i,j,t) represent patent,
technology category and application year, respectively. ηi is a firm fixed effect and
δt the application year fixed effect. COi,j,t is a vector of covariates, and i,j,t is the
error.
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My model is motivated by Lanjouw and Schankerman [2001] but I include the
additional variables Examiner Backward and Forward Citation Percent, growth
of technology categories and entity fixed effects and omit indicator variables for
entity types, such as individual inventors, foreign firms operating in the U.S., firms
operating in the U.S. which were in the original model.
I estimate the model on the full dataset and then predict litigation risk for each
patent. Robust standard errors are clustered at originating entity level.
Other Variables
Individual Inventor: 1 if the patent is assigned to one inventor, and there is no
corporate assignee of the patent, 0 otherwise.
Small Originating Entity: Small Originating Entity is 1 if in the bottom
quartile of original entity size, 0 otherwise.
Medium Originating Entity: Medium Originating Entity is 1 if in the middle
half of original entity size, 0 otherwise.
Large Originating Entity: Large Originating Entity is 1 if in the top quartile
of original entity size, 0 otherwise.
Hotness: The hotness index captures the recent growth in a field by measuring
the share of backward citations that are recent. I define hotness as the percentage
of backward citations to patents that are at most three years older than the citing
patent.
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B.1.2 Additional Summary Statistics
Deal-level Summary Statistics
Table B.1 reports deal-level summary statistics on all deals through which the NPEs
acquired patents from 2003 - 2014. Compared to Table 2.1, the average entity size is
substantially smaller, indicating that the acquisitions from smaller firms are more
numerous and have a smaller average deal size. In fact, deals from individual
inventors represent 17% of total deals, over an order of magnitude higher than
the share of individual inventors in the patent universe. Combining deals with
individual inventors and small firms accounts for fully two-thirds of the acquisition
deals. Only 5% of patent acquisition deals are struck with large originating firms.
Table B.1: Patent Acquisition Deal Summary Statistics
Variables Mean p25 p50 p75 Sd
Distance to Originating Entity 31.52 0.01 28.75 53.27 28.01
Originating Patent Portfolio Size 762.56 2.31 6.54 200.40 2896.74
Log Originating Patent Portfolio Size 3.07 0.84 1.88 5.30 2.76
Litigation Risk 13.22 8.57 11.61 15.43 8.73
Individual Inventor 0.17 0 0 0 0.37
Small Originating Entity 0.50 0 1 1 0.50
Medium Originating Entity 0.28 0 0 1 0.45
Large Originating Entity 0.05 0 0 0 0.21
Total Claims 22.09 14.72 20 27 11.44
Lifetime Forward Citations 42.68 10.13 21.28 46.31 66.74
Backward Citations 20.11 6.34 10.57 20.67 30.98
Hotness 30.68 13.46 27.94 42.90 22.59
Deal Size 23.10 2 4 13 98.84
Age 7.09 4 7.11 10 4.27
Log Acquisition Price 5.91 4.99 5.85 6.74 1.27
Notes: Acquisition deal-level data from 2003 - 2014 includes all NPE patent acquisition deals in
the U.S. Please see the text and appendix for variable definitions and normalization.
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The mean number of forward citations is substantially higher in Table B.1 than
Table 2.1, while age is lower, indicating that smaller firms are likely selling newer,
more highly cited patents. Larger firms are most likely selling NPEs larger numbers
of older, less-cited patents. Deal size is right-skewed with a small number of very
large deals driving the mean up substantially; the median acquisition deal involves
only 4 patents. Age here is defined as the acquisition date minus application date,
and has a mean of just over 7 years. The deal acquisition price is normalized so
that the mean is 200. I first divide the acquisition prices of the deals by the number
of patents involved. Then, I normalize this value so that mean is 200. Finally,
I multiply the normalized values per deal with the number of patents involved to
construct normalized acquisition prices for each deal. The values reported are 1000
times the natural log of the normalized prices, used to make regression coefficients
more legible.
Deal-level Summary Statistics
Table B.2 reports patent-licensee-year level summary statistics derived from NPE
licensing deal data from 2008 to 2014. The licensee is the ultimate end-user of the
patent; most patents in the dataset have multiple licensees. It is immediately appar-
ent that the mean distance to licensee is about 50% larger than the mean distance
to originating entity (Table 2.1 and B.1). This may lead one to believe that the
reallocation of patents from originator to licensee via the NPE is inefficient, in that
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it increases the mean patent distance and thus usefulness of a patent to a firm. This
conclusion would be unjustified, as the distance metric is an increasing function of
firm size (Figure B.1) and the mean licensee size is several times larger than orig-
inating entity size. The correct comparison would be the mean empirical distance
to licensee (46.9) versus the mean distance for a randomly chosen set of patents
in the licensees portfolio. The mean distance for the randomly chosen patents to
the licensee portfolios is 64.35, which shows that the NPE-licensed patents have
substantially smaller distance from the licensees than average.
Table B.2: Licensing Transaction Summary Statistics
Variables Mean p25 p50 p75 Sd
Distance to Licensee 46.97 23.19 44.71 71.21 29.73
Distance of Random Patent to Licensee 64.35 33.38 76.77 93.49 33.34
Licensee Patent Portfolio Size 5095.57 64 867 5347 9120.51
Log Licensee Patent Portfolio Size 6.19 4.16 6.77 8.58 3.01
Litigation Risk 11.85 6.93 10.40 14.62 8.61
Individual Inventor 0.06 0 0 0 0.25
Total Claims 19.30 10 17 24 15.22
Lifetime Forward Citations 31.34 3.46 11.34 32.86 60.32
Backward Citations 22.64 4 8 17 52.40
Hotness 32.07 2.56 25 50 29.97
Age 11.98 8 12 15 5.15
Log Licensing Fee*** 8.25 6.28 8.04 10.33 2.48
Notes: Patent-Licensee-Year level data includes all NPE licensing transactions from 2008 - 2014.
Please see the text and appendix for variable definitions and normalization.
Returning to Table B.2, I see that as with originating entity size, the licensee size
is also right-skewed. Licensee size is the number of patents (including subsequently
granted applications) in the licensee’s portfolio at the time of the licensing deal.
Because data in Table B.2 is aggregated at the patent-licensee-year level, a direct
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comparison with Tables 2.1 and B.1 is complicated, but most of the variable means
are similar. Patent age, with a mean and median of around 12, is defined as the
duration between application date and licensing date. Note that the license fee is
multiplied by 1000 for greater legibility of the regression tables. I have seen some
suggestive findings from the summary statistics; I now make use of regressions to
further investigate the impact of NPEs on innovation markets.
Figure B.1: Distance versus Originating Firm Size
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
D
is
ta
nc
e
0 5 10
Originating Entity Size
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between firm size and mean patent distance for patents
sold to NPEs. Larger firms sell more distant patents on average.
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B.2 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure B.2: The Distribution of Distance
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
D
en
si
ty
0 20 40 60 80 100
Distance to Originating Entity
NPE Patents Patent Universe
Notes: See the notes for Figure 2.6.
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